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It is eminently logical that the bare first word of 
this essay should be as to the philosophical motive that 
makes it appear interesting and fruitful. If we let two 
circles represent, respectively, the fields of ethics and 
economics, it seems probable that they will somehow inter­
sect, providing an area common to both. It is this presump­
tive borderland of ethics and economics that we intend to 
study under conditions of restricted method and scope. It 
should be confessed at once that our efforts will be neces­
sarily and rigorously theoreticalt our essay is one of par­
tial clarification of the ethical character of certain eco­
nomic theories of wages. It is probably unnecessary here to 
defend the "abstract" nature of these pages to readers thor­
oughly aware of the peculiar logical role of philosophy. In 
lectures on ethics at the University of California, Profes­
sor G. p. Adams frequently made an eloquent defense of "ab­
stract" discourse against the common indictment of useless-
—-.ess. iffe have no space for such an attempt here. 
That ethical and economic theory are inter-related in 
•some way should appear fairly probable after reflection on 
he objective data of the industrial process. For this pro-
ess is a realm of conduct of buyers and sellers with their 
c-nventional and legal "rules of the game". Industrial life 
s somewhat peaceful at least; it IB not mere chaotic war-
fare, and is obviously subject to some ethical control from 
within and above. Even extreme individualists would admit 
this and welcome, at least, legal protection of "life, lib­
erty, property and the pursuit of happiness". But we intend 
to view the terms of exchange in the field of labor through 
the eyes of economic theorists and, at once, a unique logi­
cal dilerrma arises. For, from the terms of our approach, we 
seek ethical meaning in economic theory, whereas economic 
theory, clearly in the textbook variety, decisively intends 
to exclude ethical meaning from its "descriptive" results..* 
By and large, the economist's statement runs that economics 
describes "facts"; that which "is", rather than that which 
"ought" to be. It is believed that we will discover that 
this claim to finality on this point is illusory in some 
respects which we intend to investigate. There is, indeed, 
no single voice as to the nature and scope of economic the­
ory. P. T. Homan has eloquently analyzed some of the diver­
sities of contemporary economic theory.^ We will have dev­
eloped evidence and reasons for agreeing with him as to the 
presence of conflicting views in profusion, at the close of 
our study. 
It will be obvious to all that a study of comparatively 
brief proportions in a field so vast must carefully justify 
* cf. F. R. Fairchild, E. S. Furniss and U. S. Buch, Elem­
entary Economics, I, 8-11; Macmillan, 193°* 
^ P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought. 
its selections and treatment. But it would "be needlessly 
tiresome and, in fact, is not desirable to review these 
problems in vacuo. Suffice to say that we shall view a few 
relations of employer and employee in terms of given theor­
ies of wages. These theories represent the work of out­
standing economists of recent modern times.1 But, since 
out interest is definitely ethical, anything like an ade­
quate summary of these theories is out of the question, in­
deed would be an irrelevance in the premises. We shall, in 
fact, be attracted by any evidence of "preference" i.e. an 
express or implied judgment that such and such conduct with 
reference to labor contracts and relations is "good" or 
"bad". We greet the economist with this query: "Why" do 
you apparently prefer "this" conduct "as a part of" your 
economic theory of wages? We seek the economist*s "own an­
swer" to such a question. An elucidation of his answer on 
his own terms, will give us his apparent ethical criterion 
operative in the theory of wages in question. The theory of 
preferential causation applied in a given case must be 
brought into relief and empirically justified, according to 
the terms of the given economic theory. It is just here 
that the merit of our search will be on critical trial. 
Consequently, our theory of an economist's ethical criter­
ion constitutes the "essential" exposition. The rest, in 
^ P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought. Cf. "Introduc­
tory" . 
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some degree, is requisite preparation and scaffolding. 
It is possible, then, for ua to describe ethical cri­
teria which apparently influence various wage theories, 
without entering into a maze of economic technicalities. We 
should stress this point. We seek wage theory evidence of 
ethical criteria. Only that portion of a wage theory pre­
requisite to a development of our ethical result is pertin­
ent. We can not, therefore, be criticized for failure to 
summarize completely an economic theory. Such an extended 
exposition would be dislocated and irrelevant where purely 
ethical results are sought. 
Our "descriptive" attitude means that this essay is 
strictly preliminary to certain far-reaching and critical 
interests. This position, however, need not detain us. The 
meaning is simply that this paper stops short of broader 
constructive possibilities for purposes of clearly isolating 
ethical criteria in the given wage field. In passing, we 
may allude to these larger problems by saying that they in­
clude immanent and extrinsic criticism of the ethical cri­
teria found, in terms of some unifying standard; and, in 
addition, a change of venue from economic theory to the act­
ual industrial world, for purposes of revising ethical-econ­
omic theory d£ novo. We can sum up the limits of this essay 
from the content of this paragraph, by denominating our in­
quiry a phase of possible prolegomena to the evolution of an 
ethical criterion adequate to certain economic problems. In 
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J. A. Hobs on'a recent book Economics and Ethics, we have an 
excellent example of these larger ethical issues close to 
the industrial field handled in masterly fashion. 
The ethical criteria we seek make an abstract charac­
terization of them otiose; but it is conducive to clear or­
ientation rapidly to review a few ethical possibilities. It 
is not likely that we will find resort to a supernatural 
ethical criterion in contemporary economic theory. In early 
political economy the contrary expectancy was in order; for, 
then, church and state were warp and woof of a loosely or­
ganic assemblage of considerations bearing on "wealth" 
The rise of economic science is commonly said to have been 
motivated in no small degree by the forceful reaction of 
"business" to the interferences of political and ecclesias­
tical powers. The assertion is widely repeated that early 
classical economic theory tacitly defended the evolving 
needs of adolescent industry, no longer loyal to extraneous 
interests. This same thought may be expressed in another 
way by saying that pure deductive economics, with its bundle 
of characteristic assumptions, was a brilliant defense of 
the competitive status quo and, at once, a positive philos­
ophy or creed of the collectivistic advantages of "every man 
for himself" where property, industry, purchases and sales 
are concerned. The isolation sought by individualistic man-
1 Cf* Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 177&. 
ufacturers of early English industry was probably reflected 
in the method of deductive isolation of their theorists.  At 
least the literature tending to this conclusion is large.1  
But there are far-reaching problems here that do not concern 
us. The problems are set within those of the general rise 
of science. And though, to be sure, self-conscious business 
leaders wanted a "hands off" argument in Impressive terms, 
the urge towards "science" in social studies, as evidenced 
by the early Physiocrats, probably would have strained 
towards "immutable natural law" as a fundamental scientific 
desideratum. And, more to the immediate position that tran­
scendental ethics is not l ikely to be discovered in contem­
porary economic thought, this trend to "immutable natural 
law" would perhaps, of i tself,  press the analogy to physical 
sciences, by delimiting the scope of economics to the meas-
ureable monetary terms of exchange. Whether or not these 
aside reflections will be fully granted, the current "cli­
mate" of opinion in theoretical economic circles is appar­
ently non-supernatural and decidedly relativistic. And this 
leads to a fairly sound abstract expectancy as to the nature 
of ethical criteria in wage theories. So sweeping, indeed, 
has been the modern current of relativism that we are very 
likely frequently to meet the tacit view that an "absolute" 
is ridiculous in the premises. Prom this standpoint a prob-
Cf. J". A. Hobson, "The Rise of Economic Science", Econom-
ics and Ethics; also P. T. Homan, ibid; "Introductory". 
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lem sets "relations" for (ethical) inquiry; and the ethical 
criterion will be a function {in some sense) of the "rela­
tional context". 
We are led, then, to this thought, that we may abstract­
ly expect to discover species of ethical relativism in the 
wage theories we study. This short development will do for 
our purposes at present. It sums up that "absolute" criter­
ia, in a transcendental sense, are, abstractly considered, 
unlikely; and that, on the other hand, some form of ethical 
relativism is a likely discovery. In addition, we must be 
on our guard (assuming the soundness of our expectancy) to 
differentiate degrees and kinds of "relativism", for where 
the given brute data are widely treated as "really" rela­
tive, nothing illuminating is said by crying "relativism". 
It probably is too trivial to remind the reader that these 
thoughts are in no sense a defense of the writer*s ethical 
position; they are invoked solely in abstract preparation 
for a relevant expository medium of the central issues of 
this essay.* 
We turn, then, within our abstract expectancy of ethi­
cal relativisms, in another direction for a moment* We may 
roughly call the present word a hint of the "ins and outs" 
dichotomy, explained below; or, if "isms" be permitted, we 
1 The possibility of an ethical "absolute" within experience 
may be granted. This possible alternate to supernaturalism 
and relativism does not, I believe, invalidate the terms 
of expectancy, stated above, as to the ethical criteria 
likely to be found in wage theory. 
refer to "ethical objectivism" and "ethical subjectiviam" as 
broad divergencies of standpoint. Here, leaning in expect­
ancy is largely presumptious on abstract terms. Professor 
W. P. Montague has used a simplified exposition in terms of 
temperamental" impulse to "look in" or "look out" for final 
criteria of conduct.1 Whether or not "temperament" deter­
mines the locale envisaged as the seat of final ethical 
authority, we may reasonably expect some economists to "draw 
in" ideals from somewhere "out there" and, diametrically op­
posed, we may reasonably expect some economists to "draw up" 
ideals from "within". The vagueness of this abstract ex­
pectancy may be readily admitted and the matter dropped. In 
hasty defense, we may say that it has seemed worth while to 
hint that an economist may be expected to add "something" 
out of his deeper, unique slant on life, his "personal equa­
tion" if you will, which it would be particularly interest­
ing to detect. Perforce, our narrowed data of wage theory 
may largely thwart this interest in this essay, except on 
very tenuous grounds. In sum, our expectancy of ethical 
relativism may, with uncertain chance, turn towards "psycho-
logism or rigorous "objectivism", but, more likely, perhaps, 
to "compromise". 
Finally, the ethical criteria found may, with reason­
able abstract possibility, be irreducible, in large part, 
along the lines thrown out above. That is to say, we may 
W. P. Montague, Seminar in Cosmology, University of Calif­
ornia, Spring of 1928. 
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expect, speaking out of our logical vacuum, an apparently 
simple and clear-cut standard of reference, say in terms of 
"common sense", "custom", "legality", "help social improve­
ment", "healthy human interests", "public welfare" etc. etc. 
Indeed these cases may be most frequent and will,  when be­
fore us, offer tremendous difficulty, for the "simplicity" 
is only apparent, and the difficulties of characterizing the 
effective ethical criteria consequently great.  It  will be 
too easy to accept an easy phrase of vague "principle" as an 
ethical criterion. Hi'e will  need to probe well with our rel­
evant theory of preferential causation, before we conclude 
that all  has been said that might be said on the evidence. 
At the same time, adequate rendering of the ethical 
criterion given in the wage theory evidence is all  we set 
out to do. Assuming our task complete, any inherent inade­
quacy of the criterion is no present concern of ours. If 
conduct is truly preferred, apparently, by reference to a 
standard taken as authoritative, that standard, however 
"simple", is the ethical criterion for our exposition. 
Furthermore, the terms of wage theory may, in many cas­
es, apparently exclude all  standards of conduct, except 
those implicit in the tendencies of economic "laws" that are 
laid down. Here are challenging problems, for a bald tour 
de force that asserts an economic "law" is an ethical cri­
terion, is unallowable. A sound theory of preferential 
causation, indeed, may meet cases under the restrained con-
10 
ditions of our data, with reference to which wise discretion 
will compel the conclusion that no "ethical" criterion is 
discernible. But, since the terms of economic theories of 
wages must include human (exchange) conduct, our close scru­
tiny to discover ethical meaning, if  possible, is justified. 
For, i t  seems reasonable to suppose that theories of wage 
conduct contain (at least) implicit ethical meaning. Wheth­
er the entire contexts of wage theories are involved in eth­
ical meaning may well be left art open quention for the pre­
sent. On the other hand, we do not suppose that wage con­
duct overlaps more than a significant part of the whole 
realm of ethical conduct, we do seek, in a word, the prob­
able common borderland of the "is" and the "ought" in wage 
theories, where facts are truly normative, in an "ethical" 
sense, as displayed by economists. 
We can do no more than pause for a moment to make a few 
comments concerning the contemporary phase of the rise of 
economic "science". The tendency we shall be particularly 
interested in pointing out is that towards "induction". To 
do more would throw our introduction out of proportion; to 
do less would fail  to provide the suggestion of a proper 
setting. 
Deductive economics is said to have achieved i ts apex 
with Ricardo, after a rapid rise from the great work of Adam 
S m i t h  i n  1 7 7 6 . 1  A  t u r n i n g  p o i n t  i a  t h e n  n o t e d  b y  t o m e  e c o n ­
o m i c  h i s t o r i a n s ,  a l o n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c u r r e n t  o f  
" s u b j e c t i v i s m " .  T h e  t r e n d  o f  i n t e r e s t  f o r  u s ,  h o w e v e r ,  l a  
a s  f o l l o w s .  E a r l y  e c o n o m i c s  w a s  p e r h a p s  o r g a n i c  I n  a  " f l a t ­
h y "  s e n s e .  B y  r i g i d  i n s i s t e n c e  o n  a  s e t  o f  p o s t u l a t e s  e . g .  
p r o p e r t y ,  f r e e  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  ( p e r f e c t  m o b i l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  a n d  
l a b o r ) ,  t h e  " e c o n o m i c "  m a n ;  a n d  b y  e q u a l l y  r i g o r  u o  u s e  o f  
t h e  d e d u c t i v e  m e t h o d ,  a  b o d y  o f  e c o n o m i c  t h e o r y  w a s  b u i l t  u p  
w h i c h  a c h i e v e d  a l m o s t  a d o r a t i o n  f r o m  e c o n o m i s t s ,  b u s l n c o B  
m e n ,  a n d  c o o p e r a t i v e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  o f f i c i a l s .  T h i s  o r g . m o n  
o f  " l a w s "  a p p a r e n t l y  f i t t e d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  n e e d s  o f  t h e  
t i m e s  f o r  a n  a g g r e s s i v e ,  p r o f i t - s e e k i n g ,  a m b i t i o u s ,  " s e l f ­
i s h "  f r a t e r n i t y  a n d ,  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t ,  w a s  s u s t a i n e d  b y  t h e  
b r o a d  e v i d e n c e  o f  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  t h a t  l a  1  s s e 2 .  f a  1  r e  c a u s e d  •  
B u t  c h a n g e  i n  e c o n o m i c ,  s o c i a l  a n d  l e g a l  w a y s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
b r o a d e n e d  v i e w s  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  a t t a c k s  o n  
c l a s s i c a l  e c o n o m i c s  f r o m  a  v a r i e t y  o f  f r o n t s .  S o m e  o f  t h . s .  
a t t a c k s  w e r e  v i o l e n t  o n e s  b y  l i t e r a r y  m e n ,  s u c h  a s  C a r l y l e  
a n d  E u s k i n .  S o m e  e h a l l e n g e s  w e r e  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  s o c i a l  I n  .  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s e n s e .  K a r l  K a r x ,  a n  e m i n e n t  e x a m p l e ,  u s e d  
t h e  d e d u c t i v e  m e t h o d  b a s e d  o n  n o v e l  " s e l f - e v i d e n t  p r  
p i e s .  T h e n  a g a i n ,  a  n e w  I n t e r e s t  I n  c h a n g i n g  c o r p o r a t e  
f a c t s  a n d  t e n d e n c i e s ,  a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  c a u t i o u s  a n d  
+  t h e  g e n e r a l  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
x  C f .  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  £ e | | r a  H o b s c n ,  I b i d . ;  J .  
paragraph: P.  T.  p o l i t i c a l  E c o n ^rj T- V e b l e r ,  
K e y n e s ,  *  
T h e  n f  S c i e n c e _ r n _ - h ° d e r n  
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detailed revisions by economists. Take, for example, the 
"wage fund" theory, which was gradually picked to pieces by 
the general run of economists. This theory, in broad terms, 
states that there is a "fund" set aside by capitalists for 
wages, a hypo thetically tagged supply of "capital" reserved 
for payments to labor. This "fund" is the capitalist 's evi­
dence of foresight and self-denial,  his functional service 
to labor. Wages are pro-rata parts of the "fund", an as­
sumed "constant" of the industrial system. The criticism of 
this deductive theory proceeds in gneral,  in terms of i ts 
distance from the facts. For example, in passing, the "fund" 
is a mythical entity, real "causes" do not unambiguously de­
termine i t ;  then, again, the strength of bargaining power 
held by an employer lead to doubts as to the justice, and 
validity, of this "rationalization" of his "subsistence" 
payments. The contrasts of rich and poor lead to searches 
for effective measures of reform, and adequate "real" rea­
sons. The purport of these remarks is neither to explain 
nor criticize the "wage fund" theory but to illustrate, in 
the field of wages, a general trend in the rise of economic 
"science" of interest for our purposes. This trend is 
towards "induction" as a method of investigation in econom­
ics and away from the unrealities of "pure" theory. 
P. T» Homan's remarks sum up that the present state of 
economic "science" is chaotic when compared with the rela­
tive unity of method and scope of the physical sciences.^" 
1  P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic: Thought, 10-13-
It  is interesting to review rapidly the economists he consid­
ers, in the light of the tendencies to induction ve are sug­
gesting. J .  a. Hobson leans heavily towards inductive stud­
ies with a pronounced "organic" emphasis, A. C. Pigou of 
England and ,T. B, Clark of the United States are outstanding 
exponents of the deductive method, tempered by "qualitative" 
(Pigou) and "dynamic" (Clark) leanings. Then, a prominent 
and wide school of statistical economists led by W. C. Mitch­
ell ,  make specialized monographs and schedules, evidencing 
l i t t le,  if any, interest in deductive theory of a universal 
sort.  The statisticians have broken away, largely, from 
effective loyalty to classical theory. The deductivists,  
however, hark back to their master, Alfred Marshall,  who 
broadened classical theory with fresh inductive and human 
insight. Much of the deductivist 's work is defensive a-
gainst the opposed deductions of Karl Marx. Tborsteln Veb-
len has been a powerful factor as satirical critic of deduc­
tive method, in alien terms of the "instinctive" source of 
ends and worth, he has provided elaborate and widely versa­
tile studies of the growth of economic institutions, read 
both by the implied light of the "pure ineptitude of clas­
sical.  economists, and the actual conflicts of "business" and 
"welfare" interests. According to P. T. Jloman, the diver­
sity of economic views is almost legion, a disconcerting, 
purely personal flavor being caste over the work of each 
economic "scientist". 
This sketch of strong inductive movements, even in the 
defensive ranks of classical offspring, must suffice, In 
terms of our recognition of wide confusions that promise a 
variety of ethical criteria in wage theories, "if", indeed, 
they are to "be found there at all. 
We may, then, close our introduction v.ith this word In 
suininary. We will select fruitful wage theory illustrations 
for our purposes; these may be called "ethical" wage prob­
lems. These can not be laid out abstractly for they depend, 
in large part, on the positions held by the economists stud­
ied as to the method and scope of economics. These posi­
tions vary widely, consequently a wide variety of wage prob­
lems necessarily underly our selections of illustrations. 
As said above, we will be attracted by those partial phases 
of wage theories that promise most satisfactory play, in a 
given case, to our adaptive theory of preferential causation. 
For the critical burden of our essay turns on a fair render­
ing of ethical criteria apparently assumed as valid by vari­
ous economic theories of wages. 
This scheme of inquiry results in a necessary exposi­
tory plan. Our essay is a series of personal studies of 
variant ethical points of view based on the actual contexts 
of wage theories. Prominent economists must be allowed, 
first, to speak frequently for themselves. Representative 
direct quotation is therefore a virtue in this fir.>t part 
each study which demands a hearing of economists on their 
own terms. The concluding section of each study will have 
two phases. First,  the textual evidence will fee reviewed in 
our own terms of preferential causation in order to isolate 
the operative ethical criterion in the textual premises. 
Secondly, a comparison and contrast of discovered ethical 
criteria will he made solely as a means of further differen­
tiation of the criterion found; this treatment will reveal 
an essential continuity in our essay based upon i ts consis­
tent selection of wage theories and i ts equally persistent 
isolation of the ethical criteria apparently assumed as val­
id there. In a word we may sum this up by saying that each 
personal study is 1. the brief but pointed presentation of 
an economists views in his own wage theory terms; 2. a con­
cluding theory of preferential causation, close to the tex­
tual evidence in standpoint,  but in our own interpretative 
language; and 3* a n  exposition of apparent similarities and 
contrasts of the several ethical studies, in order to dif­
ferentiate the isolated ethical criterion. 
Problems of contrast and comparison, just mentioned, 
determine the following order of study of economists. J .  A, 
Hobson faces relevant problems squarely with an explicit  
ethical emphasis. J .  B. Clark's early work bears a close 
resemblance to Hobson's standpoint; his later deductive 
analysis marks a crucial transition to an antithetical posi­
tion. T. Veblen's scientific stand opposes Clark's view of 
the character of scientific economics and is complementary 
to Hobson's position. W. C. Mitchell owes a great deal to 
Veblen arid adds a significant statistical character to his 
treatment. A. C. Pigou retrenches ClarJt*s mature position 
with considerable awareness of opposing considerations. A. 
Marshall,  Pigou's acknowledged authority, displays an ethi­
cal liberalism which is most interesting at this juncture. 
Finally, K. Marx analyzes familiar issues on radically dif­
ferent basic assumptions. 
J ,  A. HOBSON 
I t  is  the purpose of this section to bring into relief 
the ethical criterion operative in the wage theories of J.A. 
Hobson. TSe will  consider a few of his representative books 
severally,  reserving comparisons to our concluding remarks* 
The wage discussions in Economics and Ethics revolve 
around two problems: 1.  the nature of the wage bargain and 
2.  the adjustment of wages in the interests of industrial  
peace. These discussions, to use Hobson's terra,  are "prac­
tical" i .e.  they stay close to the actual industrial  world. 
They are,  therefore, not to be classed with the usual typa 
of wage theory* Indeed, one important thread of their mean­
ing is that deductive wage theory is inadequate to the "or­
ganic" needs of the industrial  process.  We will  give a 
brief exposition of Hobson's position as to the above two 
problems, after certain prefatory concerns; throughout we 
will  mainly develop the salient points of his "organic wel­
fare" criterion. 
Hobson states his ethical criterion for practical econ­
omics explicitly and at  considerable length. I t  might be 
objected that Hobson's emphasis on "practice" throws his 
criterion out of court in a discussion that lays claim to 
study wage "theory". This objection is not valid.  Hobson s  
stress on the practical nature of his work is  due to his 
unique view as to the method and scope of economics. He es­
pouses a "behaviourist!c" economics that reviews the re­
sults of statistical economics in the interest of "organic 
welfare" i.e. the social good. 
There is no need to "read in" an ethical criterion into 
Hobson's writings. Since our inquiry promised some diffi­
culties in deciding just what was the ethical criterion 
present in a chosen wage theory we should admit at once that 
no such difficulty, due to failure to write on the problem, 
is present in the work before us. Here our difficulty is one 
of fair condensation of a full and direct treatment of the 
nature of an ethical criterion in its relation to "practi­
cal" wage problems. 
There are, then, good reasons for facing the views of 
Hobson first. He has long emphasized the close relationship 
of economics to ethics. The major problems of economics are 
problems of control for him; and his view favors far-reach­
ing "organic" direction rather than "detailed" direction. 
Traditionally, and largely even at present, each business 
unit stands on its own financial feet. Ho wonder that econ­
omists have built up theory which presupposes the rigid 
facts of private property and sharp competition. We begin 
to see why Hobson is so "practical", for he desires certain 
reforms of actual control of the economic system. He is not 
content with taking things as they are; he desires to pro­
vide an ethical tool to guide remodeling of economic prac-
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tices. All of this sketches reasons for entering the door 
of wage theory that disdains ethics, through the evangelical 
brilliance of Hobson's work. Well-trained in economic the­
ory, this prolific economist has held the torch of ethics 
up to economics for years. 
V/hat does Hobson mean by his "organic welfare" criter­
ion'' There is no doubt about the close relationship of this 
criterion to economics. It is a most thoroughly articulated 
ethical criterion, adjusted to the problems of economics. 
Hobson regards the following words as expressive of the es­
sence of his ethical criterion when analyzed for its own 
Bake t 
If nature makes so much nisus (directive activity) 
towards the preservation and growth of a species, and if 
social cooperation plays the distinctive part it seems to 
do in human survival, then it may be argued that the high­
est value attaches to the conduct and the emotions which 
sustain society in the elaborate structure it has attained, 
and assist it to further useful modes of cooperation.1 
We shall turn now to the first of the wage problems 
stated above, in the interest of clarifying this ethical 
criterion as it operates in Hobson's treatment of wage is­
sues . 
The argument concerning the nature of the wage bargain 
is part of a much larger view that we must weave into the 
picture. This larger view is a famous Hobaonian viewpoint 
that led an American committee of economists to choose him 
to write a textbook which "introduces the student to the 
1 J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics, 73. 
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subject of economics from the standpoint of ethical values".* 
The book we are discussing is the outcome and was invited by 
economists who believe economics and ethics are closely in­
ter-related. For years our author has tied his discursive, 
and certainly voluminous, writings together on the theme of 
the pervasive presence in our economic system of "unearned 
increments" . The term derives from its frequent application 
to land rents but in Hobson's hands becomes an ubiquitous 
tool of research, criticism and reform. With zeal and in­
sight Hobson persistently points to "forced gains" that a-
rise in unequal bargaining situations. According to this 
stand, almost all bargains are between unequals, one side 
being possessed of relatively stronger financial strength. 
Coupled with this analysis and designation of the class 
"surplus" (unearned increment) that our economic system 
makes possible is a program of centralized political reform 
and more equitable distribution of income e.g. wages. The 
"surplus" should be taxed or diverted in better individual 
outlays for enhancement of "organic" values. Since these 
unearned increments are excess rewards from a functional 
standpoint and are made possible by a given social (exchange 
situation, society can claim these ineffective amounts for 
public uses or for more equitable distribution, without des­
troying sound incentives to the proper working of the indus­
trial system. 
1 J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics, preface. 
We already noted that the bulk of Hobson*s treatment Is 
directly "practical", that is,  i t  is concerned with viewing 
the industrial process inductively rather than through the 
terms of classical economic theory. This position by a pro­
fessional economist deserves re-emphasis. 
This approach is prophetic of a revised economic theory 
when qualitative principles shall somewhat subdue the quan­
titative technique so narrowly followed. Hobson wavers be­
tween calling his organic analysis "economics" and "economic 
art".  With the professed quantitative standards of econom­
ists clearly before him he admits that "economists, as such, 
can not interpret their values in terms of human value",1 
The transition from money values to human values, on this 
view, is well nigh impossible in terras of the problems of 
measurement set by economists "as such". If economists in­
sist that their problems and theories are exclusively quan­
titative, then their "application" is "economic art".  This 
"application1 '  must, without doubt, review the quantitative 
theories from the wider focus of human values and, in doing 
so, develop a revised theory which might just as well be 
called another level of economics. Perhaps this practical 
level of study Bhould be qualified as "behaviouristic". 
Ispeaking close to labor interests Hobson strikes deeply in­
to his meaning of "organic welfare" in the following pas­
sage .  
I* J .  A, Hobson, Economics and Ethics. 456, 
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The contribution of a behaviouristic economics to this 
civilizing process will consist in developing a technique 
and organization which will continually reduce human costs 
and increase human utility of economic goods and services, 
thus liberating an ever larger proportion of the growing en­
ergies of a better natured and better nurtured humanity for 
non-economic activities and enjoyments,1 
At least as much general background as we have given is 
necessary in order to appreciate better the following anal­
ysis as to the nature of the wage bargain. 
The principle of organic welfare that is tested in wage 
problems is the Saint Simonian majcimi "From each according 
to his powers, to each according to his needs".2 The anal­
ysis contrasts present conditions with a way out. 
The "normal'1 terms of economic equilibrium, zealously 
sought by deductive marginal theorists, are put to a crucial 
test in the wage situation. Hon-competing groups are too 
patent a challenge to the deductive postulate of "perfect 
mobility". This recognition is in fact forced on the atten­
tion of marginal economists, so that questions of "justice" 
supplement "pure" wage theories in interesting ways. 
Whether or not other economists enter forbidden ethical 
lands or not, Hob3on resolutely regards the bargaining situ­
ation (like other economic facts) from the side of human 
valuation. The following argument, therefore, runs in terms, 
in part, at least, of the "ethical" inadequacy of deductive 
wage theories, which assume perfect individualism and compe-
1 J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics. 456. 
2 IMd., 220. 
tition. 
Hobson sees the present conditions of bargaining as a 
"mechanism of markets" which "works by a conflict of for­
ces".1  As to positive remodeling of the market situation* 
a true ethics of bargaining should control markets as "an 
equitable instrument of cooperation for the economic welfare 
of the community" The meaning here is that i t  is not 
enough to analyze wage markets as a "mechanism"; behaviour-
istic economics does more in pursuit of decisive social im­
provement .  
The present status of the worker with reference to his 
wage-contract should be grasped first.  Then, problems of a 
new order of control and direction of economic welfare should 
be faced. As we look at present conditions we should ask 
relevant questions in the interest of "organic welfare". Is 
payment made according to needs? Is work allocated accord­
ing to powers? 
At present the worker is "forced" to sell his labor-
power continuously in order to live. This is an "urgent 
compulsion" upon which his very life depends.3 The employ­
er 's position is radically different, for he is in no imme­
diate hurry as to any wage bargain. His criteria are nar­
rowly financial.  The wage bargain is,  therefore, heavily 
1  J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics* 2-3* 
2 Ibid.,  3• 
3 Ibid.,  172-130. 
weighted in favor of the buyer, of course, in terms super-
ficial to the vital problem here presented, the capitalist, 
too, must finally purchase "some" labor for his chosen busi 
ness venture. But in the isolated play of wage agreements 
the employer has the whip hand; he is not pressed by any­
thing like the vital eagerness to buy labor-power as the 
worker is bound to sell it. The significant point is, then 
that the balance of power (and injury) in the actual labor 
markets of today is very heavily weighted in favor of the 
employer. The "goods" which a worker delivers are, in ef­
fect, his "whole body and soul". He is compelled to sell 
his labor-power without delay and the capitalist is fully 
aware of this fact, and notably takes full advantage of his 
strong position. That an unearned increment or surplus ac­
crues to employers as a result is indubitable. Miserably 
low wages of women and children have been substantially 
raised in certain cases because of organized bargaining pow­
er or legal devices; the employers easily "stand" these in­
creases from the financial standpoint. They simply draw 
from hitherto enormous "surpluses" ie. huge bargaining 
"forced" gains. 
The whole flavor of this argument reveals that ethical 
and practical questions are paramount-, "or Hobson, wage 
facts are normative. Economics is a "part" of ethics. Its 
major problems are those of "control" in the direction of 
"organic" welfare. Apropos of the wage contract Hobson 
writes the following. 
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It is,  perhaps, the heaviest ethical indictment of the 
economic system that in its operation it  is bound to assume 
(a false assumption) that man is a purely economic being, 
and to ignore all  or nearly all  of the other human processes 
and values that are involved in the economic l ife.1  
The force of this quotation is enhanced by the consideration 
of the risks and dangers to workers that cannot be compensa­
ted in money and that are commonly never given any attention 
except where gross and flagrant. The ethical-economic prob­
lem of labor is the progressive one of "organic" elimination 
of sub-human" experiences in industry. Organic values 
should determine the "costs" of production and the "utili­
ties" of consumption. The omission of a human treatment of 
"costs" is a serious failure of past economists. 
T/e turn now to the second of the wage problems dis­
cussed by Hobson in this book i .e.  their adjustment in the 
interest of industrial peace. 
Conflicts between employers and employees are the order 
of the day in our economic system. The wage agreement is 
determined by balancing the powers of the parties to t he 
contract. Ken fight because the system operates on a fight­
ing basis. 
The problem that Hobson is discussing here arises when 
an arbitrator is called in to settle an industrial conflict 
concerning the amount of wages to be paid in a given busi­
ness or trade. The insuperable difficulty in arbitration 
adjustments is that the arbitrator has no power to fix pri­
ces. Prices (or values in exchange) are "social determina-
1 J. A. Hobson, Economics and Sthics, 210. 
tions" .  An award to maintain wages at a standard rate is,  
therefore, impossible to carry out; and an award depending 
on profit  and loss factors is of no use. The crux of the 
difficulty is that arbitrators can do nothing else, as 
things are, than take a "separatist" viewpoint, looking only 
at the affairs of one business or, at most, a trade. The 
only competent lever of control can be exercised by one pos­
sessing a national or inter-national authority. This cen­
tral authority should then make decisions by reference to 
the welfare of the whole community. This calls for radical 
reforms. For, at present, the economic system puts each 
business on i ts separate financial feet; "every man for him­
self" is the systematic modus vlvendi. This criterion of 
economic conduct is defective because very many of the fac­
tors determining business success or failure are beyond the 
control of the entrepreneur and in the control of society. 
Complete autonomy of the single business "still  stands as 
t h e  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e c o n o m i c  g o v e r n m e n t " ;  w h e r e a s ,  t h e  
social system of exchange to which the single business must 
adapt itself or fail ,  is largely beyond the control of the 
given business. 
So far,  this argument means that "detailed" arbitration 
is futile. U7hat is the way out of this impassd to feasible 
organic action? The answer is postponed because the problem 
itself requires revision from the standpoint of "organic 
welfare". 
The fundamental fact that the operations of the whole 
economic system go to determine what actual payments 
beside that between capital and labor in the business £nU?l 
Here the argument rests upon the factors discussed as to the 
nature of the bargaining process. For these "larger con­
flicts are, for example, between "exposed" and "sheltered" 
trades, or between "town" and "rural" industries. But these 
larger conflicts result in "forced gains" or "unearned sur­
pluses" just as they do in a single wage agreement. The or­
igin and social disposition of these far-reaching surpluses 
set the proper field for study, These studies are of cru­
cial importance and must be kept up to date. Only through 
thera can the evolving social structure be adjusted in terms 
of community powers and needs. So we return from a discus­
sion of "arbitration" to the central theme i .e.  the location 
and organic disposition of the "surplus". Better public 
uses of the surplus are matters for a central authority to 
investigate and engineer. Hobson concludes this discussion 
in the following words? 
< +  Jh iL'analysis of divergent interests might be carried 
into further detail.  But enough ha3 been said to indicate 
the large number and variety of group discords within the 
economic system, produced by a social determination of val­
ues and prices which is regulated by arrays of economic 
force and not by any principle of distributive justice or 
regard for human welfare.2  
J. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics. 1.81. Por Hobson, the 
present bargaining system determines the employer to take 
iorced gains; the leveling oi surplus is an .organic, prob-
2  ibid.,  184. 
Economics and Ethics was written in 1929$ in I9OO The 
Economics of Distribution was introduced in the following 
language. 
In particular,  i t  claims to prove that all  processes of 
bargaining and competition, by which prices are attained and 
the distribution of wealth achieved, are affected by certain 
elements of force which assign "forced gains" and other ele­
ments of 'economic rent" to the buyers and sellers.  There 
is  thus established the existence of a large fund, partaking 
ot the nature of those monopoly and differential rents,  long 
ago recognized in the case of land, which furnish no stim­
ulus toyoluntary industrial  energy, and which can be taken 
lor public service by taxation without injury to industry.1  
For Hobson, the existence of the surplus is a fact,  for 
he readily admits that fact-finding, knowledge of present 
conditions or statistics,  is the first  investigative step, 
preliminary to problems of guidance and reform. Why does 
Hobson prefer one l ine of action rather than another with 
reference to the unearned gains that normally arise in une­
qual bargaining situations? The answer is  tucked away in 
the above quotation in the term "public service". How there 
is a sense in which any scientist ,  economist or otherwise, 
would grant that "welfare" is  the end of his endeavors.  I t  
is probably true that all  economists pay incidental homage 
to the "good" of society at  some time in their writings. 
But i t  is necessary to emphasize that our inquiry is not on 
this level.  For we are wondering whether or not theoretical 
economics does, as a matter of fact,  make i ts  theories with­
out resort to express or implied ethical judgments.  We get 
a clear answer from Hobson on this point.  V»'hen economists 
J* A. Hobson, The Economics of Distribution, VI 
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go beyond painting a picture of things as they are they be­
come students of economic guidance. As students of economic 
administration they posit "ends" of action. Sooner or later 
these plural ends must refer to some dominating idea of hu­
man value. Why exchange goods? Why exchange goods with 
certain motives rather than others? Exchange cannot he con­
ceived without introducing at least two human beings. "It 
takes two to make a bargain" and economics studies bargain­
ing conduct. The conflict that Hobson faces in the theoret­
ical circles is also a conflict in the industrial world, it 
is a conflict of philosophies, of ethical criteria. On one 
side are arrayed laissez-faire loyalists; on the other side 
are aligned those who see in varying ways that there are 
many problems of exchange so saturated with the public in­
terest and responsibility that they demand solution from the 
position of society's power and needs. These two types of 
economic reasoning are in conflict in The Economics of Dis­
tribution, with Hobson clearly the antagonist of lalssez-
f&ire. Do laissez-faire economists avoid ethics according 
to Hobson? Explicitly and formally, yesf implicitly and ef­
fectively, no. For example, consider the issue concerning 
the efficacy of trade-unions.1 According to Hobson, Alfred 
Marshall when viewing the matter with practical sympathy 
(when off-guard as an economist, so to speak) tends to point 
out the helpfulness of trade-unions to workers. When he ap-
1 J. A. Hobson, The Economics of Distribution, 221-226. 
plies "economic reasoning", however, his answer is decisive; 
trade-unions interfere with free competition; free competi­
tion will (in the long run) lead to economic equilibrium; 
economic equilibrium means that the gains of wage-bargains 
have been divided equally; that each has received his "mar­
ginal net product", according to the equilibration of demand 
and supply. Hobson's reply meets the challenge on Its 
technical grounds, namely on the great field of traditional 
economics: "the terms of exchange equilibrium". He reasons 
in Marshall's language of marginal analysis and accepts, 
tentatively, a cost (productivity) theory of price based on 
competing demand and supply.1 He sounds orthodox until the 
determination of price at a point which distributes the gain 
of a bargain equally is assevered. Here is the weak spot in 
equilibrium analysis. A, buyer, has a maximum high and a 
minimum low price that his resources and his diversity of 
needs will allow. The price market itself sets the range, 
in part, within which A will "barter". 33, seller, has a 
price range too; he will close the sale at any point within 
this range, striving, like A, to take all he can get. The 
upshot of the transaction is a matter of strength,--finan­
cial, strategical and what-not. This "system" of exchange 
is a virtual field of battle where unearned prizes follow 
night and cunning. These surplus gains are "differential" 
i.e. they depend on the relative strength of the given bar-
J. A. Hobson, The Economics of Distribution, 93* 
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ga ine r* . 1  R e t u r n i n g  t o  t he  ques t i on  o f  t r ade -un ions ,  t he  
p r e sen t  f a c t s  t end  t o  l e a r e  worke r s  I n  a  weake r  pos i t i on  
t han  emp loye r® .  The  e f f i c acy  o f  a  t r ade  un ion  canno t  b e  de ­
c ided  In  gene ra l  t e rn s  bu t  i f ,  i n  a  g iven  ca se ,  s ays  Hobson ,  
o r ga n i za t i on  o f  worke r s  w i l l  t end  t o  eq u a t e  t he  r e s pec t i ve  
b a r g a i n ing  p o w e r s ,  an  e qua l i z a t i on  o f  g a in  i s  c e r t a i n ly  more  
| . r o t ab l e .  Bu t  Hobaon  goes  on ,  a s  he  a lways  does ,  t o  ques ­
t i ons  o f  t h e  Inhe ren t  de f ec t s  o f  a  ba l a nc e -o f -pow e r  sy s t em 
o f  exch a nge .  Qu es t i o ns  o f  eo o n o mic  ad ju s tm en t  w i l l  neve r  be  
so lved  a s  l ong  a s  "migh t  ma ke s  r i g h t "  i n  ba rga in s ;  s oc i a l  
gu idance  i s  c a l l e d  f o r ,  and  t h i s  imp l i e s  a  ne w  p h i l o so p h y  o f  
gove rnmen t ,  new  e t h i ca l  c r i t e r i a ,  ne w  we ig h in g  o f  human  va l ­
u e s ,  new  t e ch n iqu es  o f  t a xa t i on ,  new  c r i t e r i a  o f  wage  p ay ­
men t s  e t c .  
Ce r t a in  f e a tu r e s  o f  Kobson ' s  e t h i ca l  c r i t e r i on  sh o u ld  
new  be  c l e a r .  I t  I s  p r og r e s s ive ,  r e l a t i ve ,  e s s en t i a l l y  ob ­
j e c t i ve .  I t  i s  p rog re s s ive  i n  t e rms  o f  t he  evo lu t i on  o f  
soc i e ty  a nd  human  r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  t he  d i r ec t i on  o f  t h a t  
advance  t o  be t t e r  f i t ne s s  t o  s u r v ive .  I t  i s  imme rse d  i n  r e -
1  & t i c  no  " a s  t he y  a r e "  up  t o  a  c e r t a i n  po in t .  B u t  whe n  know­
l ed ge  c f  r e l a t i ona l  f a c t s  a s  t hey  a r e  i s  r e a c h e d ,  e . g .  t he  
e x i s t e n ce  o f  su rp lu s " ,  he  t u rn s  t o  p rob l ems  o f  ob j ec t i ve  
gu idance  c f  t he  econom ic  sy s t em.  The  "good"  i s  ob j ec t i ve  
' . K o J , o n ' .  Th e  Sconon i c s  n f  D i s t r i bu t i on .  ^OQ.  F r . n  
. . ob son ,  g r a - eo"  wa ge -pe wer s  a r e  "d i f f e r en t i a l s "  i n  ba r  
r a i n ing  fo r ce  o n  t he  s i de  o f  l a bo r "  
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social good which Implies opportunity for subjective well-
being. His ethical criterion is economic because that is 
his subject-matter.  He is not blind to more unique values 
than the social,  but these are beyond his economic province. 
It  has been said that wThe end of all  good government 
is to make government superfluous". May i t  be said that the 
end of economics is,  though not, indeed, to render economic 
processes superfluous, at any rate continually to reduce the 
part they play in comparison with those "unbought graces of 
l ife", those free creative activities, in which production 
and consumption are fused in costless satisfactions".! 
How does Hobeon's ethical criterion influence his the­
ory of unemployment? We will  quote from The Economics of 
Unemployment, revised in 193*» with this question in mind. 
In Hobson's words the general thesis of this volume is as 
follows. 
If,  say, consumption could be maintained at three-
fourths of the high war standard, and could be applied pro­
ductively to enhance the future efficiency of the human in­
strument, instead of being applied destructively, i t  would 
seem that trade fluctuations might disappear, by a policy 
which would not merely avert unemployment (outside the minor 
requirements of economic elasticity), but would furnish the 
economic conditions for a continually increasing productiv­
ity, with a corresponding rise in the general standards of 
consumption.2  
This thesis boils down to a search for the economic mean of 
spending and saving, of immediate satisfactions and post­
poned satisfactions, of consumable goods and capital goods. 
The central issue is an essay in equitable distribution, for 
the present system piles up "surplus" in the hands of the 
1 J.  A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics. "Finis". 
2  J. A. Hobson, The Economics of Unemployment, 9-
t 
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rich who invest it in excessive outlays of capital or pro­
ductive goods. The results are wasteful consumption, cut­
throat competition, organized restriction of output, cycli­
cal depressions etc. 
If the surplus income of the rich which produces this 
congestion and these stoppages were absorbed, either by the 
increasing share of the workers, or by the needs and uses of 
an enlightened state, or by both, this economic disease 
would be remedied.^ 
The standard at stake is the order and progress of society. 
The core of the theory is more than "financial", it is hu­
man, organic, social, practical. To be sure, the facts dis­
close that an excessive part of national income goes into 
production goods i.e. new factories, machines etc. But, 
why? The system of exchange itself piles up surplus, auto­
matically creating the extreme classes of rich and poor. 
Those who are most in need are unable to buy; those v.hose 
every desire is fully satisfied are able to buy almost with­
out limit and therefore seek expanded ways of "investment". 
The remedy? Remove the surplus elements from large incomes. 
The remedy may be read as a trend in "natural" economic evo­
lution or as a policy of statesmanship. Industrial peace, 
security and progress (the "real facts disclose") demand a 
drastic, redistribution of the product of industry. 
If State Socialism, or Guild Socialism, or Consumers' 
Cooperation, or any form of Communism, can achieve this bet­
ter distribution, without unduly letting down production, we 
may look for salvation along any of these paths. But if, as 
I am disposed to believe, no people is prepared to launch in 
any wholesale way on any of these revolutions, some mixed 
policy of national ownership of prime monopolies, control of 
1 J. A. Eobson, The Economics of Unemployment, 10. 
profi ts ,  prices and condit ions of  employment in  other  Indus 
t r ies  where some measure and degree of  direct  or  indirect  
competi t ion survives,  with a  l imited period of f ree profi t­
able enterprise as an incentive to new enterprises—the 
whole of  this  l inked up by a  tax system whereby society se­
cures for  beneficial  public services the idle elements of  
income which do not  nourish or  evoke productive effort—thi  
mixed policy adapted to the varying condit ions in the world 
01 industry wil l  beat  achieve the bet tor  and more equal  die 
t r ibution and ut i l izat ion of income that  are required" 
Let  us consider  a  detai led port ion of this  argument,  
bearing on the desirabil i ty of public works as  an expedient  
in rel ieving unemployment.2  The spir i t  and point  of  the 
whole discussion enter  into every detai l .  Since public 
works would serve to distr ibute the surplus to unemployed 
labor who would buy consumption goods,  i t  is  a val id exped­
ient  in abnormal t imes.  I t  is  granted that  these works are 
less eff icient  than normal productive act ivi ty,  but  the em­
ergency makes this  comparison i rrelevant .  The t rue compari­
son is  between the non-economic s tatus of idleness and some 
productivi ty and consequent  purchasing power.  The momentum 
of public works derives from taxes on idle elements of  sur­
plus capital ,  originat ing as functionlese accumulat ions of  
unearned gains,  and pi l ing up Inordinately at  present  
through want of  profi table investments.  The weakness of  
credit  inflat ion,  protect ionism, and price manipulat ion is  
that  they side-step the simple human demands a t  s take and 
fai l  to provide purchasing power to  the miserably poor.  A 
revised ethical  cr i ter ion that  works from organic human 
1  J.  A. Hobson,  The Economics of  Unemployment.  122-126.  
2  Ibid.- ,  126.  
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needs to technical devices that satisfy felt  needs is in or­
der. Business and i ts theorists still  postulate remedies on 
the assumption of financially competent units in free compe­
tition. The inevitable result of laissez-faire competition 
is not to give to each according to his needs nor to take 
from each according to his powers. The present unemployment 
crisis is a case in point.  Sconomic statesmanship has a 
positive role to fill  in equating purchasing power, by dis­
tributing a surplus that provides no necessary incentives to 
the proper working of the industrial system. Public works 
constitute an emergency device that tend towards this sound 
re-distribution. 
Those, however, who hold that the sound communal servi­
ces thus rendered have immense direct and indirect results 
in more healthy, intelligent, mobile, enterprising labour 
can make a strong case for arguing that such public expendi­
ture is amply justified, even in terms of an early increase 
of productivity.! 
A very recent l i t t le booklet by Hobson condenses his 
essential viewpoint to "consumers* socialism"; i t  is enti­
tled From Capitalism To Socialism and came off the press in 
1932. The pivotal importance of the theory of surplus is 
undiminished. An unrevised capitalism contains the seeds of 
decay since i t  does not contain a government of industry 
that makes due public use "of the immense waste resources of 
the economic system".^ Economic balance of production and 
1  J. A. Hobson, The Economics of Unemployment. 123. 
J.  A. Hobson, From Capitalism to Socialism. 29. 
consumption is the technical requirement, so that the ethi­
cal standards of "leisure, the first condition of a full 
l ife for a human being" may be satisfied for all .  The scope 
of economic government is envisaged as a "world government" 
which controls the issues of the proper balance of work and 
leisure. This government should be "by genuine representa­
tion of the people" and not by the conservators of surplus.1 
The true equilibrium for study is between saving and 
spending. Economists have notably specialized in the equil­
ibrium of prices, reasoning according to the inter-actions 
of price, demand and supply. "But taking the saving process 
as a whole, the 'price law* is inoperative".^ There is an 
"irrational factor" present that makes the readiness to sup­
ply new productive capital unpredictable. The same is true 
as to wages and labor. High wage rates are commonly accom­
panied by a restricted market in which they apply. The 
"tendency" of price-law to determine an increase in supply 
of workers by an increase in wages is therefore actually 
frustrated. Even assuming free mobility of labor the "law" 
fails to apply, for given standards of l iving are of predom­
inant importance. And standards of l iving depend on quality 
factors in the population, falling birth rates, reduced 
child mortality, higher efficiency of labor etc. There is 
thus "no calculable relation between wages and supply" of 
J .  A. Hobson, Prom Capitalism to Socialism, 52. 
2  IMd.. 30. 
labor.^ Higher wages, in some cases, mean less. work. Sum­
ming this argument up, there is no quantitative relation be­
tween pay and productive output. Higher professional servi­
ces are a case in point. "Chance" rather than "measured 
economic motives" plays the important part in actual bar­
gains. How can "chance" be minimized except by conscious 
economic government of an extensive world of exchanges? 
How can a financial criterion orient these problems, when 
money is only a tool of exchange, and the true problems are 
organic ones of correlated production and consumption? 
What are, then, the salient features of Hobson's ethi­
cal view? A true ethics of economics crystallizes all tech­
nical methods to the simple barter situation that involves 
all human beings. Economics is "human" economy of work in 
the interest of social welfare (and consequent individual 
satisfactions in leisure). The ethics of economics is the 
ethics of work-a-day affairs that points to routine commun­
ity values, and beyond to the unique personal values that 
can only be nourished and advanced in a solicitous social 
medium. Economic anatomy is conceived with therapeutical 
intentions; the historical, statistical or theoretical in­
terest is bound up with the revision of economic conduct in 
the light of organic values relevant at the time, so that 
mankind may survive with requisite well-being and happiness. 
Put another way, this ethical criterion is grounded upon an 
1 J. A. Hobson, From Capitalism to Socialism, 41. 
analogy to "biology rather than mechanics .1 The maintainance 
and growth of the economic system is a key interest. At 
present our competitive exchange institution fosters waste* 
due to an iiievitable creation of unproductive surplus. The 
lines of evolution laid down place objective social values 
in a central position as criteria of organized conservation 
and guidance. And, throughout, the social importance of a 
solicitous interest in individual needs is stressed.^--So 
far we have aimed to characterize Kobson's "organic welfare" 
criterion in wage analyses—an explicitly defined ethical 
criterion. This extended acknowledgement by a professional 
economist of the ethical interest (as such) within the terms 
of wage theory, may be properly called an exceptional case. 
The relatively high repute of Hobson as an economist makes 
his human standpoint a valuable "searchlight" for our pur­
poses. With his human wage problems before us, we may well 
ask (and answer) the query: What, after all, is an ethical 
criterion in wage theory? In emphasizing that concern for 
human values and welfare marks an ethical criterion, we can 
also properly stress that it is not our purpose here to de-
1 Hobson's mechanistic (dje facto) analysis does not vitiate 
(for him) this interpretation of his ethical criterion. 
Apparently, he thoroughly repudiates the utilitarian ethi­
cal implications of traditional competitive analysis. 
^ To what extent, if any, Hobson's view is a contradictory 
compound of competitive price system economics and an 
organically controlled social economy is irrelevant here. 
Our task has been to record the ethical criterion apparen­
tly assumed as valid in his wage theory. 
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fine the ethical criterion for wage theory, hut to establish 
a general basis of recognition of any ethical criterion that 
may be found in the more rigidly "technical" contexts of 
wage theories. Hobson's treatment from the human standpoint 
has provided some general earmarks or criteria of any ethi­
cal criterion in wage analyses. 
Furthermore, it may safely be said that economics for 
Hobs on pushes the importance of an explicitly articulated 
ethical criterion in wage theory to the center of attention. 
The study of his "organic welfare" criterion has therefore 
served as an excellent introduction to what follows. For if 
we discover references to "human values" (expressed or im­
plied) in wage analyses, we are justified in defining these 
references as "ethical". Hobson has provided us with a sur­
vey of human interests in wage problems that raises diffi­
culties for the economist who would avoid an "ethical" stan­
dard of human welfare by confining himself to "technical" 
wage problems. It requires a relevant theory of preferen­
tial causation, in the cases of some economists, in order to 
organize evidence and proof for the conclusion that an ethi­
cal criterion animates a given wage analysis. The "human" 
characteristics of these problems are of vital importance 
for our theory of preferential causation in hard cases. Un­
less the human solicitude of an economist is recognized as 
being an ethical interest (which presupposes an operative 
ethical criterion) there is little chance that our conclu~ 
sions will be admitted by doubtful readers at critical 
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. But such a doubtful reader is at the same time de-
fchat Hobson's treatment is ethical, which is manifest-
trary to fact; no more deliberate and elaborate ethi-
unan) analysis by a professional economist can proba-
found. 
>.r example, to anticipate a "hard" case, when accept-
the status quo is implicit in mechanistic wage anal-
in investigation of the "ethical" (human) presupposi-
is called for. The crucial point, recalling the human 
it of Hobson,, is to see the "accepted" relatione of 
;e mechanics to the human characters and motives which 
; active principles of these exchanges. "If" the 
at explicitly (and consistently) excludes all human 
t by answering only one narrow question, viz. how the 
e" runs, we would conclude that no ethical criterion 
rectly" involved. But, in the light of the undoubted 
e of central questions, of human and social welfare, 
3 not properly stop there. For, though a narrow 
s avowed by the economist in question, It probably is 
1-ized. There may be resort, in the last analysis, to 
flying ethical standpoint i.e. assuming the validity 
vage analysis, "this" principle of wage payment 
* apply on human grounds. If this immanent reference 
1 values or welfare is present, an ethical criterion 
'Qntly assumed as valid and is properly characterized 
fully as the evidence allows. 
II 
" .B .  CLARK 
The  e a r l i e r  work  o f  J .  B .  C l a rk ,  The  Ph i l o s ophy  o f  
^ ea l t h ,  c on t a in s  a  s t r ong  sp i r i t  o f  r e fo r m  wh ich  makes  I t  
ak i n ,  a t  t imes ,  t o  t he  po in t  o f  v i ew  w e  h a v s  Ju s t  b e e n  con ­
s i de r i ng .  I t  o r i g ina t ed  a s  a  s e r i e s  o f  a r t i c l e s  f o r  t he  I»ew 
Eng l ande r ,  w r i t t en  when  C l a rk  was  beg i nn i ng  h i s  c a r e e r  
(1875 -85 ) .  These  e s s ays  a r e  c r i t i c a l  o f  t r ad i t i ona l  eco n o m­
i c  t heo ry ,  on  t he  g round  t ha t  i t  beg in s  w i th  n a r ro w  o r  f a l s e  
a s sumpt ions  and  t he r e fo r e  can  a r r i ve  on ly  a t  unce r t a in  con ­
c lu s ions  .  
The  be t t e r  e l emen t s  o f  h u man  na tu r e  we re  a  fo rgo t t en  
f a c to r  i n  c e r t a i n  economic  c a l cu l a t i ons ;  t he  ma n  o f  t he  s c i ­
en t i f i c  fo rmu la  was  more  mechan i ca l  and  more  s e l f i sh  than  
t he  man  o f  t h e  a c tu a l  wor ld .  A  deg r aded  concep t i on  o f  human  
na tu r e  v i t i a t ed  t he  t heo ry  o f  t he  d i s t r i bu t i on  o f  we a l t h .  
Economic  s c i ence ,  i n  gene ra l ,  f ound  no  adequa t e  p l ace  f o r  
t he  i n t e l l e c t ua l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  men ,  an d  ma d e  no  impor t an t  
u se  o f  t he  f a c t  t ha t  so c i e ty  i s  a n  o rgan i sm ,  t o  be  t r e a t ed  
a s  a  un i t  i n  t he  d i s cus s ion  o f  man y  p roce s se s  a f f ec t i ng  
wea l t h . - * -
As  we  s h a l l  s ee ,  t he  p r a c t i c a l  i dea l i sm  o f  t h i s  e a r l y  
book  i s  appa re n t l y  min imized  i n  l a t e r  work .  So  r ad i ca l  i s  
t h e  sh i f t  o f  emp h as i s ,  i ndeed ,  i t  w i l l  a lmos t  s eem t ha t  a  
d i f f e r en t  man  wr i t e s  a t  t he  l a t e r  t ime .  I n  t he  e a r l i e r  worx  
t h e  do min a t i ng  i n t e r e s t  i s  c l ea r l y  e t h i ca l .  Th roughou t  
t he se  e s says  we  f i nd  an  e va nge l i c a l  e f f o r t  t o  f i n d  a  p l ace  
i n  economic  t heo ry  " fo r  t h e  be t t e r  mo t ive s  o f  h u man  na tu r e " .  
Compe t i t i on ,  f o r  example ,  i s  keen ly  c r i t i c i z e d  a t  t imes .  
I n  t he  l a t e r  wor k  "pu re  compe t i t i on"  i s  t he  r i g id  founda t i on  




eluded. Our claim that ethical interest is a fundamental 
feature of the later work will require proof. P. T. Roman 
has given an interesting explanation of this shift of ap­
proach in terms of the movement of the 'eighties towards an 
abstract theory of distribution.1 Clark's skill as a theor­
ist of distribution won him fame in the general battle cen­
tering around the work of Karl JIarx. Clark is usually quo­
ted as the mo3t eloquent of recent defenders of the "natural" 
justice of the competitive status quo. It is therefore im­
portant to allude to his almost radical attacks on competi­
tion in the earlier essays. 
The Philosophy of Wealth, however, raises interpreta­
tive difficulties which call for brief introductory atten­
tion. There is eloquence of style, depth of penetration and 
sanity of practical idealism in the pages of these early es­
says which it would be ungrateful not to acclaim. They pre­
sent a stimulating, refreshing flow of challenges to an or­
der of industry and industrial theory conceived, at times, 
as in chaotic transition from a competitive to a cooperative 
scheme of operation. This deep, dynamic movement is strong­
ly ethical. With striking lucidity these ponderous changeB 
are poured into graceful sentences. But it is not surpris­
ing that a heterogenous lot of essays, evidencing such 
youthful vigor and practical reformatory zeal, should lack 
some coherence. One is constantly doubting whether he has 
1 P. T. Homan, Contemporary Economic Thought, 34-40. 
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bit on Clark*a essential viewpoint, till the conclusion fin­
ally dawns that there are inherent contradictions that defy 
verbal resolution. At the same time, the suspicion is iner­
adicable that there is a unity of "animal faith" underlying 
expressed diversity. Immersed in emotional fervor, the book 
precipitates many fundamental doubts, such as whether Clark 
is essentially defending or attacking competition, whether 
his ethical criterion is subjective moral sense or objective 
moral custom etc. Text could be quoted to fit the predilec­
tion of the quoter; dogmatism can only be achieved by nar­
rowness of reading and reaction. Then, too, the net impres­
sion is equally disconcertingj one is painfully aware that 
his imputations are slippery. Competition of alternative 
views for designation a3 Clark*s position arises because 
they are severally espoused with an air of finality. We 
have sufficiently created an appropriate atmosphere of skat­
ing on thin ice to warrant a courageous plunge. 
Clark calls the ethical criterion operative in economic 
conduct the "sense of right". 
In the last analysis the sense of right in men is a su­
preme motive, in the market as elsewhere. It is the centri­
petal force in economic society. Its action is not an occa­
sional or disturbing' influence; it is constant, and in­
creases with time and civilization".1 
It is our task to define the meaning of this economic ethi­
cal criterion as understood by Clark, This conception is an 
* J. B. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth. 48.. 
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intimate part of hiB qualified, though severe, critique of 
competition for "competition at best exists by sufferance, 
and the power that tolerates and controls it is moral" 
On the other hand, competition is an energetic force, 
which, in self-assertive fashion, gets things done. It is 
a "demon" if unrestrained by moral force, but "society does 
not and will not completely abandon the competitive princi­
ple? it is still needed as an agent of distribution, and it 
is the sole means on which we can rely for the securing of 
a large product to distribute" At the same time there are 
many passages which indicate that competition 1B outmoded, 
but the subtle flavor throughout substantially vindicates 
the position just stated. Cooperation is decisively con­
ceived as a diametrically opposed method of economic salva­
tion, and, at the same time, the conservator of the "moral 
sense" that checks competition. The seat of this "moral 
sovereignty" is elusive. It is a "teleogic principle in 
society"; it is a "spirit of justice" in man; it is a "su­
preme moral court".3 But the net impression is that the 
principle of cooperation itself is the ethical criterion im­
plicitly intended throughout. "Cooperation is the antithe­
sis of competition; wherever it exists the competitive 
1 J. B. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth, 48. 
5 111 id., 208. 
3 Ibid.. 208-20. 
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struggle is held, to some extent, in abeyance". 
Turning, now, to our particular interest in wages we 
will expect to see the dualism of cooperation and competi­
tion at work. 7/e conceive that Clark's youthful ethical 
criterion is defined for our purposes if the status of the 
principle of cooperation in his wage theory is "brought into 
relief. Clark accepts Henry George's theory as to the ori­
gin of wages. "He has proved that they come, not from cap­
ital, but from products" .2 Then the problem for Clark be­
comes* "What is the real source of the value which rewards 
the laborer?" And the answer is: "It is the volume of pro­
ducts which sets limits to the amount of wages". V/hat, 
then, should determine the worker's pay? "The workman's 
share is the value created by the industry in which he par -
ticipatesn.3 But, argues Clark, the relations of employer 
and employee are based upon a bargain. If competition is in 
exclusive control "a minimum of justice results where brute 
forces are unequal, and moral forces wanting".4 The ethico-
economic rule of wage competition, "Svery man for himself", 
increases the marked bargaining disadvantage of the worker 
in the competitive field unless trade-unions come to his as­
sistance. The modern corporate trend is, indeed, manifest 
J. B. Clark, The Philosophy of "Wealth, 208. 
2 Ibid., 126. 
3 Ibid., 130. 
4 Ibid., 130. 
on both sides of the wage bargain. Thus does the principle 
of cooperation come into the situation at last, and a grad­
ual obliteration o»f competition takes place. The movement 
here is towards the solidarity of capital and of labor, with 
consequent large-scale arbitration. This solidarity is a 
respective corporate amalgamation of "non-competing groups". 
The system of individualistic competition was a tolera­
ted and regulated reign of force; solidarity, even in its 
present crude state, presents the beginnings of a reign of 
law.*-
The ethical center of Clark's early wage theory is, 
then, the conflict of two principles: competition and coop­
eration. Cooperation, here, is the ethical criterion which, 
through corporate development, equalizes the balance of pow­
er of employer and employee, and finally, leads to conscious 
arbitrative adjustment on an organic social scale. Coopera­
tion is truly implicit in competition because competition is 
suffered by society as a medium of distribution of the pro­
ducts of industry. Competition passes into partial abeyance 
when corporate organization of the wage bargaining factors 
naturally evolves in the struggle to balance their powers. 
Cooperation, then, becomes more explicit as the social tele­
ology of the situation emerges in the organized means of 
adjustment; and as the perils of huge chaotic warfare become 
socially suicidal. Society is "egoistic", in the final an­
alysis, and men are "altruistic", for men possess "enlight-
ende reason" that society must be preserved at all costs. 
J. B. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth, 14-8. 
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Thus is the Ricardian postulate of "selfish man" seen to be 
partial and defective. The "organic" criterion of coopera­
tion is society's implicit sanction of competition, so long 
as it serves as a fairly peaceful method of dividing the 
product of industry in "the spirit of justice". Competition 
has no inherent certainty of endurancej there is, however, 
a pragmatic probability that human impulse to self-assertion 
and display, coupled with the social advantage of energizing 
economic conduct, will serve to maintain a residual accept­
ance of the competitive motives and processes. 
The Philosophy of Wealth contains many conflicting 
leads, among them a marginal productivity analysis of wages. 
As it turned out this trend received predominant emphasis in 
later writings. Writing on The Possibility of a Scientific 
Law of Wages in 1888, Clark reveals the lines of advance of 
which he later became a recognized master. What place, if 
any, does the cooperative criterion find in this tentative 
formulation? 
The changed level of inquiry is at once set, for "in a 
search for such a law our hope of success lies in making, at 
the outset, a study that is remorselessly theoretical".-
"A study that begins with the assumption of a theoretically 
perfect competition, and of an absolute mobility of labor 
and capital, may well end with a study of every obstacle 
that these movements encounter".1 
1 J. B. Clark, The Possibility of a Scientific law of Wages, 
40 
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The central issue, then, is this: is the reward of la­
bor, in the industry of the world, directly controlled by a 
permanent and distinguishable force? On no-rent land, Clark 
points out, a tiller gets what he produces. Throughout the 
industrial system there are similar "zones of indifference", 
territories within which it is of no importance to the em­
ployer whether the work be done or not. In these "margins 
of cultivation" the only requirement of employment is that 
the product of" labor shall at least equal the actual wage. 
Here, claims Clark, we find the markets for surplus labor. 
Does the rate paid in these markets set the general standard 
of wages? The answer for Clark is this tentatively affirma­
tive formula: "General wages tend to equal the actual pro­
duct created by the last labor that is added to the social 
working force". But, he adds, "an increasing amount of la­
bor applied'to a fixed amount of pure capital yields a 
smaller and smaller rate of return".1 Here are the tanta-
tive formulae upon which the possibility of a scientific law 
of wages must rest. There are, it appears, two relations 
here for study, the relation of wages to capital, and the 
relation of wages to products. 
It is advisable, now, to draw some relevant implica­
tions. This cursory view of a marginal productivity theory 
of wages in the making should reveal one important point for 
our purposes: intrinsically it does not involve ethical 
Ij.B. Clark, The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages, 49. 
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questions, except at the foundation. It is assumed by Clark 
that a worker should get what he produces and that the e th-
ical validity of thi3 principle is clear. The expanded eco­
nomic law established, for Clark, that in the realm of 
"pure" theory, (assuming "pure" competition) a worker does 
get what he produces. This marginal theory, therefore, 
shows the product of capital in its pure theoretical light 
and destroys "confusions" that identify the products of la­
bor with those of capital.  The least effective worker de­
termines a level of product which defines the wages of all  
who may be substituted or interchanged in the industrial 
system. The "product" meant by Clark is a "virtual" pro­
duct, which, assumes the free possibility of reorganization 
of actual tasks, as the quantity of labor moves up or down. 
Furthermore, the quantitative changes of capital likewise 
influence the product of labor at the margin, and so wages. 
Snough has just been hastily suggested to raise the 
question as to whether the whole marginal analysis, consi­
dered as a tool of economic reasoning, ha3 any ethical Im­
portance in Clark's eyes. 
With the full statement of the law we should be able to 
estimate the indictment that socialism brings agains. the 
industrial system: "Wages rise, indeed, but not in Pr°£°r-
tion to the total increase of the income o^socie y* 
workman gets less than his pro-rata share .  
For Clark, then, the whole marginal edifice is to be a de­
ductive system which refutes the deductive system of Karl 
1  J. B. Clark, The Possibility of a Scientific Law of "ages, 
59-
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Marx. "Y/e should know with the completion of our study of 
this law, whether it is true that wage earners anywhere get 
less than they actually produce". If they fail to get what 
they produce that is "robbery", "plunder".! To get what one 
produces is "justice", though Clark apparently fails to rec­
ognize that "Justice" is an ethical term. The broader ref­
erences to cooperation here fade from view. "Pure ethics" 
is excluded. The theoretical mechanics by which "each gets 
an amount gauged by the product of his own final Increment" 
is not (for Clark) an ethical problem, yet the whole scheme 
of reasoning is a moral justification of the basic founda­
tions of our competitive industrial system. One thesis 
stands out: "Under perfect competition the reward of each 
is virtually its own actual product". The theoretical de­
velopment of this thesis becomes Clark's major pre-occupa-
tion. The focus of his ethical interest i3 to define, under 
limitations of method and scope, how each does get what he 
produces. Thus, it appears, are ethical criterion and eco­
nomic reasoning rolled into one, the ethical self-evident 
base being never avowed as ethical during the course of the 
marginal analysis. The system completed, however, "justice" 
is theoretically vindicated. 
Eleven years after writing the monograph we have just 
studied, Clark issued The Distribution Of Y/ealth,. which re-
! J. B. Clark, The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages. 
6o-6l. 
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f o r m u l a t e d  t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  s e v e r a l  p u b l i s h e d  a r t i c l e s  o n  
v a l u e ,  c a p i t a l ,  i n t e r e s t ,  r e n t ,  w a g e s  a n d  p r o f i t s .  T h e  e x ­
p r e s s e d  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  b o o k  w a s  t o  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  i n c o m e  o f  s o c i e t y  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  a  n a t u r a l  l a w  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i f  t h i s  l a w  w o r k e d  w i t h o u t  f r i c t i o n  i t  w o u l d  
g i v e  t o  e v e r y  a g e n t  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  w e a l t h  w h i c h  
t h a t  a g e n t  c r e a t e s .  W i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  l a b o r  t h i s  t h e o r y  d e ­
c l a r e s  t h a t  r a t e s  o f  p a y ,  a s s u m i n g  f r e e  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t e n d  t o  
e q u a l  t h e  p r o d u c t  t h a t  i s  s e p a r a t e l y  t r a c e a b l e  t o  t h a t  l A b o r  
T h e  n a t u r a l  l a w  o f  w a g e s  t h u s  a s s i g n s  t o  e a c h  w o r k e r  v h a t  h e  
h a s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o d u c e d .  T h i s  t h e o r y  a s s u m e s  a  " s t a t i c "  
w o r l d  a n d  t h e  " c h a r a c t e r  o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s "  a r e  a e :  u m e d  t o  
c e a s e .  I t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  a n  a c t u a l  s o c i e t y  i s  d y n a m i c ,  
b u b  c h a n g e s  i n  w a g e s  t e n d  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  a  " n o r m a l  s t a n d a r d  
t h a t  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  m a y  d i s c l o s e .  " H o w e v e r  s t o r m y  m a y  
b e  t h e  o c e a n ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  i d e a l  l e v e l  s u r f a c e  p r o j e c t i n g  i t ­
s e l f  t h r o u g h  t h e  w a v e s ,  a n d  t h e  a c t u a l  s u r f a c e  o *  t h e  t u r t u  
l e n t  w a g e r  f l u c t u a t e s  a b o u t  
A s  s t a t e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  e l a b o r a t e d  t h e s i s  t h a t  f r e e  c o m p e ­
t i t i o n  t e n d s  t o  g i v e  t o  l a b o r  w h a t  l a b o r  c  r e n t e s  i s  
i c a l  a c c o r d i n g  t o  C l a r k .  T h e  " i s s u e  i s  o n e  o f  p u r e  
b u t  t h e  " m o t i v e "  o f  s t u d y  i s  a d m i t t e d l y  e t h i c a l .  
W h e n  a  w o r k m a n  l e a v e s  t h e  m i J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ h ^ t h u B ' ^ t a k e B  
p o c k e t ,  t h e  c i v i l  l a w  g u a r a n t e e s  ^  l g  t h e  r i E h t f u l  o w n e r  
a w a y ;  b u t  b e f o r e  h e  l e a v e s  t h e  m i  l n ~ u s t r y  h a s  b r o u g h t  
o f  a  p a r t  o f  t h e  w e a l t h  t h a t  t h e  d a y  s  i n - u #  r y ^  ^  f c e  
f o r t h .  D o e s  t h e  e c o n o m i c  l a w  \ . m c n ,  
1  J .  B .  C l a r k ,  T ) i s t r l b u t i o n _ o j L X e ^ ^ »  ^  *  
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does not understand, determines what his pay shall he, make 
it to correspond with the amount of his portion of the da^s 
product, or does it force him to leave some of his rightful 
share behind him? A plan of living that should force men to 
leave in their employers' hands anything that by right of 
creation is theirs, would be an institutional robbery--a 
legally established violation of the principle on which 
property is supposed to rest.1 
Though Clark interprets his "theoretical" interest in 
the competitive "plan of living" as "factual", it seems evi­
dent that he means much more than that. The regime of "prop­
erty" may "force" a worker to give up what is his by "right 
of creation", thus committing an act of "institutional rob­
bery". This "violation" is explicitly characterized as an 
undesirable plan of living. Clark here assumes a human (i.e. 
an ethical) interest and criterion, of essential importance 
to his economic theory. His chosen "plan of living" must 
satisfy his ethical demands in order to be acceptable to him. 
In truth, Clark's analysis begins and ends with concern 
for the welfare of the laboring classes. The principle of 
justice assumed is that the worker should get all he pro­
duces; no other ethical principle is allowed to compete with 
this one, for "pure ethics" is beyond the scope of his study. 
If workers create a small amount of wealth and get the whole 
of it "they may not seek to revolutionize society". The 
sole problem (for Clark) is one of economic fact i.e. does 
"natural" distribution Identify men's products and their 
gains? Clark's affirmative answer is that final (or specif­
ic) productivity governs wages. It will not promote our 
1 J. B. Clark,. Distribution of Wealth, 6. 
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purposes to do more than summarize this theory "briefly. La­
bor value is appraised at the margin i.e. at the theoretical 
point where the final unit of labor supply is engaged. The 
rate applied at the margin is the one that fixes wages. The 
rate of wages thus discovered applies to all industrial 
workers of the same average quality. The assumption of a 
theoretical series of workers of the same class is admitted­
ly not an actual situation, but this does not vitiate the 
theoretical validity of the reasoning according to Clark. 
The marginal worker is the (theoretically) last one taken 
on, at a rate which just balances with his product. Any 
member of his capacity-class must accept the same wage rate 
since, assuming free competition, a reorganization of work­
ers could place any one substitutahle worker at the margin. 
Since the subtleties of this final (or specific) productiv­
ity theory of wages do not serve to clarify Clark's ethical 
interest, we shall proceed no further. 
As brought out above, this wage theory is based upon an 
ethical postulate, which tends to become finally, in the 
theoretical terms, a law of wage distribution. For, the 
study is apparently oriented at its base, and carried on, 
according to an ethical standpoint, viz. human welfare Is 
protected and promoted if each worker gets all that he pro­
duces. It seems obvious that this principle operates for 
Clark as an ethical criterion as well as an economic law. 
Furthermore, it is entirely fair to Clark to define 
this final (or specific) productivity theory of wages (based 
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on free competition and the established order of property) 
as hedonistic. For, one noteworthy character of the argu­
ment is that it proceeds in terms of quantitative increments 
of substitutable labor-power. Again, both employer and em­
ployee calculate in a norma1 way, according to relevant fac­
tors of quantitative pleasure and pain. Coupled vith these 
obvious hedonistic implications is a utilitarian viewpoint 
as to the use of the theory in justifying the normal order 
of acquisitive capitalism. It would probably be unfair to 
Clark to insist that his wage doctrine is, in effect, that a 
worker gets what he gets according to the conditions of com­
petition and property--and that this is equitable. The eth­
ical (and economic) position intended by Clark may be seen 
more fairly in his primitive argument e.g. Crusoe could not 
reasonably expect to receive more than he created. Thus the 
"good" economic principle is postulated; and this postulate 
is further defined in the static theoretical world. It is 
not necessary for us to plumb further the implications of 
hedonism that are apparent in Clark's analysis. It is suf­
ficient to recognize that, for Clark, the competitive wage 
system has its characteristic "good" principles and results 
which are "normal" i.e. they conform to the definition of 
the natural man's reasonable economic pleasures and requisite 
pains. The pain of work is normally rewarded by the pleas­
ure of reaping the specific product: this is "good" econ­
omics. It is the maximum economic justice which the reason­
able economic man expects. If this ethical criterion (a 
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full return of the product of labor) is violated, the "nor­
mal" man may rightly conclude that he has been "robbed"; he 
may complain, then, about the competitive system. But, if  
he is shown that the system gives him his (virtual) product, 
be is estopped (for Clark) from complaint.  He has, then, no 
ethical case of objection; he is merely (at most) the ephem­
eral victim of "friction" which prevents full competitive 
justice in his case. He "tends" to get what he (or his 
"marginal" efficiency correlate) specifically produces—in 
the long run. He tends, therefore, to realize the full 
"good" of competitive economic exchange of onerous work and 
enjoyable product. 
This competitive ethics is the antithesis of Hobson's 
viewpoint--in fact is Hobson's favorite ethical "straw-man". 
Hobson would say that Clark's final ethical position is 
"separtist" rather than "organic"; that i t  is an elaborate 
"pure" defense of the individualistic status quo. He would 
suggest that wages are a social determination beyond the 
control of the worker; and that,  therefore, true organic 
ethics should award wages that are needed for a decent stan­
dard of living—at least.  He would suggest,  perhaps, that 
Clark's wage principle is a definition of wages implied in a 
passing phase of acquisitive capitalism and that evolution­
ary growth makes an organic criterion a social necessity. 
But, since our present purpose is only to isolate ethical 
criteria apparently assumed as valid, we need not press the 
contrast between the mature Clark and Hobson further. 
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Clark's later ethical criterion is eloquently congenial to 
the calculating "economic man"--a keen accountant of coet 
and equivalent gain in quantitative terms. Hohson's criter­
ion is prophetic of a new social order, where social respon­
sibility for satisfying the individual 's economic needs is 
granted, and work (according to ability) is socially organ­
ized. 
Clark's work has revealed an interesting technical 
transition on the problem of the place to be properly ac­
corded the ethical interest in wage analysis. It  has seemed 
advisable (under severe limitations of space) to stress the 
radical character of this transition. But i t  would be un­
just to Clark not to recognize, as we are constrained to 
close this study, that the "moral sense" of his earlier work 
is apparently undiminished in the mature work, which has 
given him wide fame as a theorist.  To be sure, the "cooper­
ative" bent of his keen sense of economic justice fell  into 
apparent abeyance. But there can be l i t t le doubt that a 
highly developed ethical "sense" animates all  of his later 
v/age analysis. For Clark, the competitive wage system must 
avoid all  "institutional robbery"; i t  must accord to every 
man his productive quid pro quo. The theoretical test which 
vindicates the competitive wage system has a vital ethical 
meaning throughout for Clark. It  appears fair,  then, to say 
that a vital principle of economic cooperation is implicit 
in Clark's advanced work. In a word, Clark's strong moral 
u rge  i s  so  v i v i d  and  genu ine  t ha t  h i s  own  " an t i t he se s "  o f  
compe t i t i on  and  coope ra t i on  a lmos t  s eem t o  l i e  down  t oge th ­
e r ,  Pu t ,  pe rhaps ,  i n  a  more  a de qua t e  fo rm ,  t he  p r i nc ip l e  
o f  coope ra t i on ,  w h ich  we  f ound  t o  be  C l a rk ' s  e a r l y  e t h i ca l  
c r i t e r i on ,  somehow i nv igo ra t e s  t he  beau t i f u l  l og i c a l  cons ig .  
t ency  o f  h i s  co mp e t i t i v e  s cheme .  Tha t  i s  t o  s ay ,  compe t i ­
t i on ,  pe rhaps ,  g e t s  i t s  fundamen ta l  e t h i ca l  j u s t i f i c a t i on  
( fo r  C la rk )  a3  an  i n s t i t u t i on  o f  h u man  coope ra t i on  i n  t he  
d i s t r i bu t i on  o f  pa in f u l  e f fo r t s  and .  e a rned  p roduc t s .  
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II 
T » TEBLEU 
The widely recognized fame of Thorstein Veblen as an 
influential critic of traditional economic theory justifies 
our consideration of his work. We shall view his arguments 
in The Instinct of Workmanship first.  There we will  find a 
definition of his "instinctive" ethical criterion and some 
penetrative insights on the employer-employee situation. 
The Vehlenian standpoint is complex and rich in scientific 
allusions, yet the central emphases are fairly clear. 
Vehlen assumes, with admitted dogmatism, a definition 
of "instincts" as the source of ends and the seat of author­
ity as to their validation. He reasons that,  notwithstand­
ing the probable laxity of "instinct" for psychologists,  the 
term is appropriate for a study which seeks the nature and 
causes of the growth of institutions, with particular refer­
ence to industrial "use and wont". The "native proclivities 
alone make anything worth while, and out of their working 
emerge not only the purpose and efficiency of l ife, but i ts 
1 substantial pleasures and pains as well". By definition 
"instincts" are marked off from "tropismatic" reactions 
which are "automatic", since instincts are "teleological"• 
The "instinct of workmanship" has a peculiar status, for i t  
is an impulse toward contriving "ways and means to the end 
sought". 
^ T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 1.  
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According* therefore, as one or another of the instinc­
tive dispositions is predominate in the community's scheme 
of l ife or in the individual 's everyday interest,  the habit­
ual trend of the sense of workmanship will  be bent to one or 
another line of proficiency and technological mastery.1 
Due to the presence of the instinct of workmanship in 
the complex of instincts, instincts may be said tobe both 
"intelligent" and "teleological". The scope of Veblen's 
study is set in "this endless complication and contamination 
of instinctive elements in human conduct, taken in conjunc­
tion with the pervading and cumulative effects of habit in 
2 this domain". 
Since our point of view in this essay makes an analysis 
of an ethical criterion outside of wage problems irrelevant, 
we shall turn at once to the evidence with which we are prop­
erly concerned. 
But, first,  certain matters of background are essential.  
The workman is a product of group l ife. He has no status as 
a workman outside the industrial institutional habits into 
which he is born. Hie native aptitudes go for nought unless 
he has acquired the workmanlike knowledge current in his 
given culture.3 In a "pre-pecuniary" culture workmen cooper­
ate to the common gain to no one's detriment, since there is 
no substantial private gain to be sought. "As workman, lab-
1 T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 35» 
2 Ibid.,  29. 
3 Ibid.,  138. 
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ourer, producer, bread-winner, the individual is a creature 
of the technological scheme; -which in turn is a creation of 
the group life of the community".-*-
Veblen notes with particular attention the transition 
from "free -workmanship" to the "pecuniary control of indus­
try". This advance is from savagery to civilization. The 
shift to a control of industry in terms of property rela­
tions is correlated with the advance of technological inven­
tion. Gradually, production becomes mediate rather than im­
mediate; a class of "holders of equipment" arises, who tend 
to produce in routine fashion, under control at a definite 
place. A special individual interest in "ownership" of the 
material means of production is -thus created. The exclusive 
control of the means of production carrys with i t  the control 
of the "community^ Joint product" of the "state of the in­
dustrial arts". The institution of ownership is intimately 
associated in i ts origin with the "growing advantages that 
may accrue to an individual as against his neighbors". 
"The members of the community come to work each for his own 
interest in severalty, rather than for an undivided interest 
in the common lot" 
Though the pecuniary scheme of l ife began in the "pre­
datory phase", modern civilization belongs "precariously" in 
the "peaceable phase" of pecuniary culture, nevertheless, 
1 T.  Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 144. 
2  IM£*> 1 6 1  • 
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the dominant note is still  the self-regarding impulses, for 
the economic interest converges on property rights. 
Ownership is self-regarding, of course, and the rights 
of ownership are of a personal, invidious, differential,  
emulative nature; although in the peaceable phase of the 
civilization of ownership, force and fraud are, in theory, 
taned out of the game of acquisition,—wherein this differs 
from the predatory phase proper.1  
Where, as in modern culture, emulative self-interest is 
directed to the acquisition of property, there is an in­
creased application to work--for acquisitive purposes. This 
enhanced diligence is not a direct interest in workmanship 
or serviceability. The direct interest is in pecuniary 
gain, the "authentic end" is the amassing of wealth. This 
dislocation of values (instinctive ethical criteria) leads 
to "conspicuous waste" and sharp conflicts between the 
haves and the have-nots. Kore fundamentally, a dichotomy of 
attention arises, in that workmen experience a daily disci­
pline close to the industrial process ruled by a demand for 
efficiency that the pecuniary logic entails,  whereas the 
capitalists are narrowly concerned with a quest for profits.  
The deeper meaning here is that there is a current distor­
tion of values; pecuniary evaluation is the dominating con­
cern, whereas the instinct of workmanship for the common in­
terest should be paramount. Even more fundamental,  then, 
than the instinct of workmanship is the "parental instinct". 
1 T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 172. 
2 Ibid.,  17^. 
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This instinct should set industrial ends (and make them 
worthwhile); the instinct of workmanship would, then, strive 
to devise mean3 for their achievement. The parental instinct 
should, therefore, he the ethical criterion of economic re­
lations. Modem economic culture is (slightly) a compromise 
over "sheer predatory culture" in favor of the parental in­
stinct; "self-aggrandisement" is mitigated (somewhat) by the 
rules of property themselves. 
That authentication of ownership out of which the sa­
cred rights of property have apparently grown may well have 
arisen as a sort of mutual insurance among owners as against 
the disaffection of the dispossessed; which would presently 
give rise to a sentiment of solidarity within the class of 
ovmers, would acquire prescriptive force through habitual 
enforcement, become a matter of customary right to be con­
sistently respected under the institutional forms of proper­
ty, and eventuate in that highly moralised expression of 
self-aggrandisement which i t  is today.1 
This "moral" and "peaceful" competition within the order of 
property reveals the workings of the "primordial parental 
instinct" and, in addition, a tendency that may eventuate in 
i ts ^rehabilitation". 
According to Veblen, modern conventional ethical stand­
ards are constituted by the pecuniary culture in an inter­
esting way. Upper, middle and lower classes are respective­
ly predatory, business and industrial classes. The first 
class is "disservicable" (aristocratic) and "gainful", the 
second Is "gainful" and the third is "serviceable". The 
common man recognizes these "canons of reputabiiity" and in­
terprets the first class as "meritorious" and the third 
1  T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship. 182. 
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class as "discreditable". "Aristocracy without unearned 
wealth, or without predatory antecedents, is a misnomer".1  
The enlargement of the second (commercial) class makes peace­
able business the ruling interest of the modern community. 
Since the commercial gainfulness of business is correlated 
with the productiveness of industry, as we noted above, im­
provements of technology follow as an indirect result.  
It  has seemed essential to develop the above background 
of the modern wage situation, in preparation for our inter­
est:  what ethical criterion does Veblen apparently assume 
as valid in wage theory? A central fact (for Veblen), con­
cerning the modern wage situation, has been presented. Pecu­
niary gain is the present effective incentive to industry. 
"At least superficially, or ephemerally, the workman's in­
come under this pecuniary regime is in some proportion to 
his product".2  In any event, accountancy of price and owner­
ship is thrown into the foreground. The discipline of prof­
i ts is impersonal; i t  is favorable to the advance of the in­
dustrial arts in the indirect way mentioned above. But what 
of the traditional economic theory that rigidly identifies 
the wages of labor with i ts product? The Veblenian stand­
point is that this theory is now an "archaic" reading of a 
passing commercial phase of culture. 
1  T. Veblen, The instinct of Workmanship, 182. 
2  Ibid.,  184. 
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Among the assumptions of a hundred years ago was the 
premise, self-evident to that generation of thoughtful men, 
that the phase of commercialized economic l ife then prevail­
ing was the immutable normal order of things. And the as­
sumptions surrounding that preconception were good and comp­
etent; for a formulation of economic theory that takes such 
an institutional situation for granted and assumes i t  to be 
unchanging, or to be a terminus at quern.* 
Veblen ,s account is,  however, "genetic"! i t  must, there­
fore, account for just that which traditional wage theory 
takes for granted. The new order points to less dependence 
on the "captains of industry" and more dependence on. "indus­
trial engineers". The "ideal" of pecuniary motives and hab­
its is a "contamination" of the instinct of workmanship 
which should work for the parental instinct.  For, there is 
an impulse to the common good that should give final value 
to the pursuit of industrial efficiency. The parental in­
stinct (being primordial) is only in partial abeyance as the 
controlling ethical criterion of economic l ife. The instinct 
of workmanship, as i t  throws off contaminating shackles of 
pecuniary bias, will  serve i ts inevitable source of ends and 
values. The parental instinct sets ends that are "service­
able, noble and beautiful for the common good".2  The "po­
larization" of employer and employee, arising from "differ­
ential gains" and "conspicuous waste", will  hasten a revi­
sion of institutional habits and finally give the primordial 
impulses uncontaminated play. The instinct of workmanship 
1 m. yeblen, The Instinct of Workmanship. 207. 
2  Ibid. ,  217• 
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will not always remain harnesses to a false "ethical" inter­
est i»e. the financial standards of economic conduct. The 
parental instinct can not die of disuse "because i t  is part 
of a native endowment of instincts, and the "basic human 
source of ends and values for the social welfare. The in­
stinct of workmanship, ever active with whatever institu­
tional habits are at hand, is substantially aligned, at 
present, with the wrong master. There are signs, however, 
that this is a passing phase; and, already, the parental in­
stinct is reasserting its native force. 
The critical evidence of this transition to sound in­
stinctive sources of valueB and ends is,  for Veblen, the 
loose industrial contacts of the capitalistic class. The 
marked industrial inefficacy of capitalists is bringing into 
relief the vivid contrast of sound instinctive ethical cri­
teria and the pecuniary prostitution of the "complexus of 
instincts". Viewed objectively, the economic habits of the 
pecuniary cultural phase are obsolescent. To be sure, these 
archaic social habits are works of the technological bent 
(the instinct of workmanship) in the service of "invidious 
competition for property". But the fault is not with the 
instinct of workmanship, which can readily be reoriented to 
the sound ends of social serviceability. 
The productive unfitness of employers of workmen is a 
matter of fact for Veblen. 
1  T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, 222. 
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Even a cursory survey of the current achievements of 
these great modern industries a3 managed 'by businessmen, 
taken in contrast with the opportunities afforded them, 
should convince anyone of the technological unfitness of 
this "business management of industry.1 
This unfitness is shown by the resort to efficiency engin­
eers to handle industrial problems in terms of prices and 
profits.  There is a growing awareness, among the large mem­
bership of this expert industrial class, of the false goal 
standing in the way of the true end of serviceability to the 
community at large. The present pecuniary control is given 
a misleading "ethical" caste, because of the indirect resi­
duum of social welfare that workmanship accomplishes in sub­
servience to false pecuniary ideals. The really basic con­
flict arises in that pursuit of profit  which manipulates 
markets and prices for the advantage of gains based on no j 
concern for industrial and social welfare. The exclusive 
•\ 
modern criterion of wages e.g. is pecuniary; the wage-bar­
gain is narrowly a price bargain with strong differential 
advantages wielded by the employer. Enough conventional 
"rules" are introduced to maintain a peaceable regime, but 
I 
the pecuniary bias is not accountable to labor-welfare be­
yond this bare minimum. But the expert workmen, who have j 
learned to master the technical phases of industry, see 
their false leadership, even as they make the price-deci­
sions which ruthlessly overlook the welfare needs of fellow 
workmen. The scientific bent (the modern development of the 
i'j 
1 T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship. 222. 
sense of workmanship) cannot help but apply i ts expert train-
ing in finding "causes" and "devices" to the end of a grad­
ual purging of this decadent commercial idealism; for the 
modern mechanistic conceptions are essentially a technolog­
ical advance which the expert workmen have discovered and 
applied. The "suzerainty" of the price system and its "opu­
lent manipulators" is,  too, a technical device of exchange, 
but certainly not a social ideal grounded on basic human im­
pulses .1 
It  must be conceded that the sharp emphasis on individ­
ual rights had i ts advantages in an age of petty trade, and 
settled questions of wage distribution with a considerable 
degree of social satisfaction at that time. Nevertheless, 
the modern large-scale machine culture demands a revised 
scheme, based on a return to the true source of values i .e.  
the parental instinct.  "Under the teaching of the price 
system efficiency came to be rated in terms of pecuniary 
gain."2 pecuniary efficiency is only incidentally in­
dustrial efficiency. The pecuniary habit has contaminated 
the workman's special concern of serviceability. Workman­
ship has come to be confused with "salesmanship". Unearned 
gain is accepted as a measure of productiveness* 
In sum, the bearing of this false price idealism on wa-
&e s  places a premium on bargaining strength; "men are con­
ceived to serve the common good somewhat in proportion as 
1 T. Yeblen, The Instinct of Workmanship. 325» 
2  Ibid..  344-. 
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they are able to induce the community to pay more for their 
services than they are worth" The machine industry has 
intensified the wasteful effects of such price-bargains, 
both on the side of "opulent display" and wide-spread pover­
ty. But there is a basic impulse that will not be downed 
which sees that "the processes of industry are bound In a 
comprehensive Bystem of give and take, in such a manner that 
no considerable fraction of this industrial system functions 
n 
independently of the rest". The pecuniary motive, a growth 
of pecuniary institutional habit,  will  gradually release the 
sense of workmanship, more and more, to service of t  rue eth­
ical ends which the parental instinct provides. 
Building, again, from the premises of the radical dis­
tinction between industrial and pecuniary employments, Veb­
len speaks as follows concerning wages in The Place of Sci­
ence in Modern Civilization. 
In modern l ife remuneration is,  in the last analysis, 
uniformly obtained by virtue of an agreement between indiv­
iduals who commonly proceed on their own interest in point 
of pecuniary gain. The remuneration may, therefore, be said 
to be a "function" of the pecuniary service rendered the per­
son who grants the remuneration; but what is pecuniarily 
serviceable to the individual who exercises the discretion 
in the matter need not be productive of material gain to the 
community as a whole. ITor does the algebraic sum of indi­
vidual pecuniary gains measure the aggregate serviceability 
of the activities for which the gains are got.3 
1 T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship. 35°-
2  Ibid.,  35°. 
3 T. Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,304-j> 
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This view is radically critical of the usual productivity 
theory of wages e.g. that of J. B. Clark. According to Veb-
len, the two ideas of productivity and remuneration should 
be dissociated. Y/ages are not, finally, a function of pro­
ductivity but an outcome of the wage bargain. The worker 
will sell his services at the most advantageous price possi­
ble in the pecuniary wage market. The lower limit of this 
price is a competitive pecuniary fact, and tends to the 
standard of living which will support the needed supply of 
labor. The discretion in wage contracts rests with the indi* 
viduals making the bargains under the given conditions of 
the price system. "Society" does not reward the worker for 
his services; modern wage transactions are not carried out 
for the sake of the "collective good". A worker does not 
get in pay what he produces, but what he can bargain for. 
A productivity theory of wages expresses "faith in a bene­
ficent order of nature", rather than facts about the modern 
community operating on a pecuniary basis. The "natural" or­
der of classical productivity theory is contrary to fact 
e.g. the facts of waste of energy and goods; and of "deter­
ioration" in pecuniary societies. The Crusoe economy, to 
which resort is made by productivity theories, is not a mod­
ern industrial community. The fact is that production is 
subordinate to the profit and loss situation of the employer 
--and the employee. For, the employee must make a relevant 
price bargain under the pecuniary labor market conditions 
and the wider conditions of pecuniary interest of the em­
ployer, The profit  motive is now paramount for all  con­
cerned; production is "pecuniarily" efficient i .e.  profit­
able sales to customers are an essential,  part of the price 
game. Where price considerations happen, to tie in with 
"better service to customers, the better service will follow, 
but this conformity to the public good is not in the "order 
of nature"; where profits are possible through waste, or es­
sential disservice, the profit  motive will control.  Buyers 
and sellers work in modern price markets in severalty; their 
interests are discrete and in pecuniary terms; the wage con­
tract is no exception. The claim that a worker gets all  he 
produces is sentimental; i t  is not true.1  
For Veblen, then, the ethical criterion that is evolv­
ing in the growth of economic institutions is the instinct 
for the public good (parental instinct).  Allied with thiB 
proper source of ends and values, the industrial interest 
(instinct of workmanship) will  eliminate the wastes of pre­
sent production e.g. that of "keeping up appearances". Veb­
len is a student of institutional genetics and does not dog­
matize a constructive program. He does, however, apparently 
envisage a trend to an economic system based wholly neither 
on contract nor status. He clearly sees the false ethics of 
current, wasteful "invidious emulation", which is an inevi­
table counterpart of exchange by contract,  based on private 
1  T.Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization, 304-10. 
property. Whatever the future nay evolve in the way of a 
revised economic system, it is certain that production for 
consumption, driven "by the uncontaminated impulse for the 
economic good of the total social economy, is a sound ethi­
cal tendency. The current false wage ethics follows from 
institutional facts and hahits which put the pecuniary In­
terest in control, whereas the industrial interest, in the 
service of the total social good, is natively fundamental. 
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IV 
»v. c .  MITCHELL 
W. C. Mitchell delivered the presidential address at 
the thirty-seventh annual meeting of the American Economic 
Association, held In Chicago in 19^.4. He discussed Quanti­
tative Analysis in Economic Theory. Since Mitchell wrote 
his doctoral thesis on the green-hacks he has rapidly ad­
vanced as a leading exponent of quantitative analysis in 
economic theory.1  The group of statistical economic anal­
ysts is very large today and for many of this group, per­
haps, Mitchell is a fairly representative spokesman. In 
his presidential address he wrote at greater length than is 
his wont on the ethical aspects of statistical economics. 
This statement is true in spite of the fact that the address 
is a hare twelve pages in length. It  will,  therefore, repay 
our close consideration. We shall afterwards turn to char­
acteristic wage analysis and note the character of the ethi­
cal criterion apparently assumed as valid. 
Mitchell 's text Is a quotation from Alfred Marshall! 
"Qualitative analysis has done the greater part i ts wor 
in economic science*and the higher and more difficult 
of quantitative analysis must wait upon the slow growth of 
thorough realistic statistics".2 Mitchell reads this q 
1 17. C. Mitchell, History of the greenbacks, Univ. of Chi­
cago, 1903* 
2 prom an address delivered "before the American -corio 
Society in 1907. 
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tion as a call to "dogmatizing about method at large" and 
acclaims the "cheering evidence of progress" that "we" are 
only "experimenting with methods in detail". Detailed meth­
ods include resort to both qualitative and quantitative an­
alysis, depending on the task at hand and the proficiency of 
the analyst. But Mitchell decides to say very little about 
qualitative analysis other than "the obvious remark that it 
cannot be dispensed with, if for no other reason, because 
quantitative work itself involves distinctions of kind, and 
distinctions of kind start with distinctions of quality". 
The issue of the address is therefore; "What can we hope 
from quantitative, the less thoroughly proven type of anal­
ysis?"^-
The first significant question which Mitchell asks is* 
does a statistician answer the questions asked by a qualita­
tive theorist? Mitchell's negative answer is based upon the 
necessity of recasting "old" problems in "forms amenable to 
statistical attack", "in the course of this reformulation 
of its problems, economic theory will change not merely its 
complexion but also its content". Marshall, asserts Mitchell, 
reasoned from fixed assumptions, whereas statistics seeks 
"empirically valid demand curves and coefficients of elasti­
city for numerous commodities". Jevons, on the other hand, 
saw statistics as the science which verified and rendered 
useful the findings of deductive science. However, the de-
1 W.C. Mitchell, Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory, 1. 
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ductive science of Jevons (e.g. the calculus of pleasure and 
pain) is "passing off the stage". Though Marshall repudia­
ted the hedonism of Jevons "he conceived of economic behav­
ior as controlled by two opposing sets of motives, the mo­
tives which impel us toward consumption and the motives which 
repel us from labor and waiting". Marshall hoped, in a word, 
that quantitative method would render the money measuring 
rod of these motives more precise. But, likewise, this hope 
is passing. For, statistical data are "objective phenomena^ 
and statistical findings are drawn out of these data--not 
"something which the theorist adds to the data". The econ­
omist does not make "excursions into the subjective", does 
not enter into metaphysics. The aim of statistical econom­
ics is to "lay a foundation in the behavior of individuals 
on which could be built an explanation of mass phenomena". 
Statistical economics goes directly to "real markets" and 
derives detailed insights therefrom; it does not construct 
an anticipatory "conceptual device" from fixed assumptions. 
Indeed, it is very likely that statistics will disregard 
"imaginary individuals coming to imaginary markets with 
ready-made scales of bid and offer prices".1 
Mitchell emphasizes that quantitative analysis, in mak­
ing objective analysis of the economic behavior of groups, 
will treat motives as "problems requiring study, instead of 
1 T. C. Mitchell, Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory, 
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"being taken for granted as constituting explanations". These 
problems will proceed by analysis of "behavior records" and 
aim at ways of experimenting upon behavior. Thus the "old" 
and "static" conceptions of human nature are passing. In 
fact,  all  students of social science are students of some 
part of the field of human behavior. Each special study 
(e.g. of labor problems) is at once a "process of differen­
tiation and integration", using the words of Herbert Spen­
cer. The characteristic production of the new economics is 
a monograph. "Knowledge will grow by accretion as i t  grows 
in the natural sciences, rather than by the excogitation of 
new systems".2-
Thorstein Veblen, claims Mitchell,  has emphasized an 
important problem i .e.  "the relation between business and 
industry, between making money and making goods, between the 
pecuniary and technological phases of economic l ife".^ 
Such topics as the economic serviceability of advertis­
ing, the reactions of an unstable price level upon produc­
tion, the effect of various systems of public regulation up­
on the services rendered by public utilities will be treated 
with incisive vigor as we become able to make indispensable 
measurements. And investigations of this type will broaden 
out into a constructive criticism of that dominant complex 
of institutions known as the money econumy--a constructive 
criticism which may guide the efforts of our children to 
msVf! that marvelously flexible form of organization better 
fitted to their needs. -If cur present beliefs are con-
TT'rmed, that the human nature which men inherit remains sub­
stantially the same over the milleniums, and that the chang­
es in human l ife are due mainly to the evolution of culture, 
1 y;. c. Mitchell, Cuantitative Analysis in Economic Theory, 
5-7 • ? """ ~ 
2 ibid.,  7 • 
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economis t s  w i l l  concen t r a t e  t he i r  s t ud i e s  t o  an  i nc r ea s ing  I  
deg ree  upon  econom ic  i n s t i t u t i ons - - t he  a sp ec t  o f  cu l t u r e  
wh ich  conce rns  t hem. - -  — - -Wi th  t he  g row i ng  p rominence  o f  i n ­
stitutional problems, the fundamental issue of welfare' TS— j 
i n ex tncao iy  i nvo l ved .  W ha t  quan t i t a t i ve  ana ly s i s  p romi se s  ; | :  
h e r e  i s  t o  i nc r ea se  t he  r ange  o f  ob j ec t i ve  c r i t e r i a  hy  wh ich  I '  j  
we  j udg e  we l f a r e ,  and  t o  s t udy  t he  va r i a t i ons  o f  t h e se  c r i -  !  
t e r i a  i n  r e l a t i on  t o  each  o th e r . '  '  The  s t a t i s t i c a l  worke r  i s  
i n  no  be t t e r  pos i t i on  t han  any  o the r  s t uden t  t o  spec i fy  wha t  
mank ind  shou ld  a im  a t ;  bu t  i n  v i e w  o f  t he  mu l t i p l i c i t y  o f  
ou r  compe t ing  a ims  an d  t he  l im i t a t i ons  o f  ou r  soc i a l  r e sou r ­
ce s  h i s  he lp  i n  measu r ing  ob j ec t i ve  co s t s  an d  ob j ec t i ve  r e ­
su l t s  i s  i nd i spensab l e  t o  c onve r t  s oc i e ty ' s  b l i nd  fumb l ing  • 
f o r  happ in e s s  i n to  an  i n t e l l i gen t  p r o ce s s  o f  expe r imen t a l  i o n .  
( i t a l i c s  added )  
Apropos  o f  " expe r ime n t a t i on"  i n  t he  i n t e r e s t  o f  w e l f a r e ,  j  
M i t che l l  conc ludes  t h a t  ex pe r im e n t s  a r e  pos s ib l e  i n  t he  so -  j  
c i a l  s c i ences  e . g .  we  expe r imen t  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  s y s t em s  o f  
r emune ra t i ng  l abo r .  Bu t  t h i s  i s  a  v i rg in  f i e l d  o f  g r e a t  
d i f f i cu l t y  be c a us e  soc i a l  l abo ra to r i e s  l a ck  t he  con t ro l s  o f  
p h y s i ca l  l abo ra to r i e s .  .  
S t a t i s t i c a l  economics ,  t h en ,  r e s t s  fundamen ta l l y  upon  
it  
o b se rva t i on ,  whe rea s  d ed uc t i ve  econom ics  p roduces  a  r aechan -  j  
i c a l  t ype  o f  exp l ana t i on  i nvo lv ing  t he  "no t i ons  o f  s a mene s s ,  
o f  c e r t a i n ty ,  o f  i nva r i an t  l a ws" .  S t a t i s t i c s  i nvo lve s  t he  '  
" no t i ons  o f  v a r i e t y ,  o f  p robab i l i t y ,  o f  app rox ima t ions " .  * 
The  a im  o f  e conomics  shou ld  be  t o  u n d e r s t an d  t he  wo r ld  o f  i  
wh i c h  we  a r e  a  pa r t .  Bu t  " a lways  ou r  t h ink ing  w i l l  cove r  a  *• 
f i e l d  l a rge r  t han  o u r  meas u remen t s ;  t h e  p r econcep t i ons  t ha t  
shape  ou r  e nds ,  o u r  f i r s t  g l impse s  o f  new  p rob l ems ,  ou r  w id -
e s t  gene ra l i z a t i ons  w i l l  r ema in  qua l i t a t i ve  i n  fo rm"  » 
1  V .C .  M i t che l l ,  Quan t i t a t i ve  Ana ly s i s  i n  Eco n o m i c  T heo ry ,7-8. 
2  I b id . ,  8 -12 .  
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V / e  s h o u l d  d r a w  s o m e  t e n t a t i v e  i n f e r e n c e s  f r o m  K i t c h e l l f c  
a r g u m e n t  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  a n  e t h i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  h i s  w a g e  
" t h e o r y " .  S t a t i s t i c a l  e c o n o m i c s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  M i t c h e l l ,  
a t t a c k s  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  c o m m o n - s e n s e  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .  D e t a i l e d  
s t u d i e s  w i l l  s e r v e  t o  r e v i s e  p r o b l e m s  a n d  p r o v i d e  r e l e v a n t  
o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a  ( e t h i c a l  a n d  o t h e r w i s e )  f o r  u s e  i n  d i ­
r e c t i n g  a n d  r e m o l d i n g  e c o n o m i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  A  s t a t i s t i c a l  
e c o n o m i c  p r o b l e m  i s  a s  c l o s e  a s  m a y  b e  t o  t h i n g s  a s  t h e y  
a r e ;  n o  e l e m e n t  o f  i m p o r t a n c e  i s  t a k e n  l o r  g r a n t e d ;  t h e  
p r o b l e m  i s  a c t u a l .  T h e  b a s i c  e t h i c a l  i n t e r e s t  i s ,  a p p a r e n t ­
l y ,  t h e  t h o r o u g h l y  h u m a n  o n e  o f  b u i l d i n g  a  b e t t e r  e c o n o m i c  
w o r l d  i n  w h i c h  t o  l i v e  h a p p i l y .  D e d u c t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  n o t  
p u r s u e d  a n y  f u r t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f a c t s  a l l o w *  I n d u c t i o n  a n d  d e ­
d u c t i o n  a r e  i n t e r - r e l a t e d  c o g n i t i v e  l e v e r s ;  t o g e t h e r ,  t h e y  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  h u m a n  p o w e r  t o  k n o w  t h i n g s  a s  t h e y  a r e  a n d  t o  
p l a n  ( " a s  w e  g o " )  b e t t e r  m e t h o d s  o f  o b j e c t i v e  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  
c o n t r o l .  T h e  e t h i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  M i t c h e l l  i s  a p p a r e n t l y  a  
m a t t e r  o f  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n f o r m e d  c o i m n o n  s e n s e .  S t a t i s t i c a l  
s t u d i e s  s h o w  t h e  r e a l  f a c t s ,  a n d  s e r v e  t o  r e o r i e n t ,  r e f i n e  
a n d  r e d i r e c t  n a t i v e  c o m m o n  s e n s e .  C o m m o n  s e n s e  n e e d s  a r e  
v a l i d  c u e s  a s  t o  w h e r e  t o  l o o k  f o r  i m p o r t a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o b l e m s .  S t a t i s t i c a l  e c o n o m i c s  p r o v i d e s  k n o w l e d g e ,  i . e .  
t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  r e v i s e d  h u m a n  a i m s - ,  t h e  m e t h o d s  a n d  c o n c e p  
t i o n s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  s a t i s f y  b a s i c  n e e d s .  T h o r o u g h g o i n g  r e a l ­
i s m  a n d  f l e x i b l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  a l l  r e l e v a n t  a n d  i n f l u e n t i a l  
e l e m e n t s  o f  a  p r o b l e m  a r e  a p p a r e n t l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  





as human needs demand, and gathers revised human insightB as 
institutional facts are made known "by statistical technique. i 
His debt to Veblen is apparent and gladly admitted by Mitch­
ell. The correlation with HobsonVs view is also remarkable; 
in Mitchell we find the statistical emphasis stressed, yet 
the phase of institutional welfare is outstanding. On the 
other hand, Mitchell's critical stand (with Veblen and Hob-
son) against a position such as J. B. Clark's is evident. 
Interesting as such comparisons are, it is irrelevant to ex­
tend them further. 
In order to introduce Mitchell's objective conception 
of an ethical criterion in wage "theory", we shall first 
select a group investigation with which he was prominently 
identified for very brief study. "The national Bureau of 
Economic Research; Incorporated", was chartered in 1920 to 
conduct "quantitative investigations into subjects that af­
fect public welfare". The first report of this bureau, 3n-
come in the United States. Its Amount and Distribution, 
1909-1919. was published a year later. The guiding ethical 
interest of the bureau (W. C. Mitchell* chairman of staff 
and director-at-large) was "a desire to learn whether the 
national income is adequate to provide a decent living for 
all persons ".1 
Allowing for a margin of error "that is probably less 
than 10 per cent" the national income for 1918 va8 ̂ 1 bil-
1 income in the United States, "Preface". 
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lions, the per capita income $5&6m, reduced to prices of 1913, 
these results are 38.8 billions and #372 respectively. 
These results are larger than for any other country, the 
United Kingdom falling second place with results of 10.9 
billions and $243. 
It should be noted that when we start from the top of 
the income scale, we must go down to people receiving #8,000 
per annum, in order to include one per cent, of the income 
receivers. Similarly, to include 5 Per cent, of the income 
receivers we have to descend to incomes of £3»200-$3»3^0* 
To include 10 per cent., we must take in part of the $2,300-
#2,400 class; and to include 20 per cent, we must include 
part of the $1700-^1800 class.1 
It would, obviously, take us too far afield to follow 
the methods or findings of this statistical study further. 
Of course, economic statistics, per se, involves only count­
ing; but "what" is counted (and "why") involve criteria, 
some of which are "ethical" i.e. "affect public welfare". 
The investigators were apparently motivated by a desire to 
know whether a "decent living" was provided for all persons. 
This is apparently the ethical criterion of this statistical 
wage study. 
Kitchell offers us statistical studies of the flow of 
money incomes--a type of work which has just been amply il­
lustrated. However, we must hear him briefly on the ethical 
bearing of this type of work. In an early study he traces 
the influence of unstable money upon labor welfare for the 
period 1860-1866. 
1 Income in the United States, "Conclusions". 
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Statistics of relative money wages, no matter how elab­
orate, throw no l ight upon the relative well-being of the 
working classes until  they have been compared with figures 
that show the changes in cost of l iving. (335) All of 
the statistical evidence that has been presented in the pre­
ceding pages supports unequivocally the common theory that 
persons whose incomes are derived from wages suffer serious­
ly from a depreciation of the currency. The confirmation 
seems particularly striking when the conditions other than 
monetary affecting the labor market are taken into consider­
ation. American v/orkingmen are intelligent and keenly alive 
to their interests.  There are probably few districts where 
custom plays a smaller and competition a larger role in de­
termining wages than in the northern states.(347-348j 
But despite all  these favoring circumstances, the men who 
stayed at home did not succeed in obtaining an advance in 
pay at all  commensurate with the increase in living expen­
ses .  (348)-—--After such an examination of the change in 
the condition of the great mass of wage-earners, i t  may seem 
surprising that few complaints were heard from them of un­
usual privations. This silence may be due in part to the 
fact that a considerable increase of money income produces 
in the minds of many a fatuous feeling of prosperity, even 
though it  be more than offset by an increase of prices,  but 
doubtless the chief reason is to be found in the absorption 
of public interest in the events of the war.(35°-3P1) 
This early work clearly reveals a strong ethical sense which 
appears to give Mitchell  a needed personal motive ior carry­
ing on as an economist.  He is  deeply interested in the 
price disturbances of a closely knit money econor.y whic 
suit in diminished human welfare. This attitude is elo­
quently expressed in a fairly recent discussion of the prob­
lem of controlling business cycles.  
During this year millions of us Tni  ma-
wished to work, bill ions of dollars .  t  8tart their 
chinery stood unused when the ® needed to consume, 
furnaces, and what we wanted to produce we neecea ^ 
The edict of enchantment which lorbade p eriodi-
wished was pronounced by the m o n ey ® We*have made, and 
cally mastered by ^h i s + s?^a i i5dinr For with all  its ef-stand idle and needy at its bidding. 
1 V .  C. Mitchell ,  * History Of The Greenbacks, 335-351-
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ficiency the money economy has a fundamental defect--it 
warps the aim of our economic activity. What we want as hu­
man beings is to mate serviceable goods. What we are com­
pelled to do as citizens of the money economy is to make 
money. And when for any reason it is not profitable to make 
goods, we are forced to sacrifice our will as human beings 
to our will as money makers. That is the heart of the para­
dox. * 
Mitchell's theory of business (profit) cycles is grounded on 
the belief, which Veblen has expanded, that the root of most 
economic evil is the relentless pursuit of profits. 
The elaborate cooperative processes by which a nation's 
people provide for the meeting of each other|s needs are 
thus brought into dependence upon factors which have but an 
indirect connection with the material conditions of well-be^ 
ing factors which determine the prospects of making money. 
When we turn to these statistical studies on the green­
backs and business cycles, we find a thoroughgoing realiza­
tion of the paramount importance of an enveloping ethical 
interest. There Is an undeniable character of homely, com­
mon sense faith in Mitchell's position. The function of 
statistical economics is to promote, in a humble way, the 
fundamentally human task of social amelioration. Mitchell 
comes to his given limited data with a deep sense of human 
needs and welfare, born of his broad sympathies and brother­
ly humanitarianism. There is a marked similarity to Alfred 
Marshall's evangelical moral warmth in his "prejudice" for 
human betterment as the driving force in economic studies. 
It is, perhaps, a matter for some regret that Mitchell does 
not analyze his vivid and dominating ethical sense in broad-
1 W. C. Mitchell, The Stabilization of Business, 52-
2 w. a. Mitchell, Business Cycles, 66. 
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ly theoretical terms. He would undoubtedly answer this 
challenge, however, in terms of the groping ethical impulse. 
which is common to mankind, that is objectively clarified, 
hit by bit,  in the process of statistical solution of local 
economic problems. There is a close affinity to Vehlerfs 
"instinctive" ethical criterion in this standpoint; ITitch-
611*3 emphatic sense of the widespread modern domination of 
money interests is also notable in this comparison. The 
l u r e  o f  p r o f i t s  i s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  m o d e r n  e c o n o m i c  m o t i v e  f o r  
Fitchell.  Like Veblen, he deprecates the substantial fail­
ure of human welfare motivation in modern economic institu­
tions .  
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v 
A. C. PIGOU 
A. C. Pigou is an outstanding English representative of 
the humanized classical tradition in economics. His immedi­
ate master is Alfred Marshall.  His method of analysis ap­
parently wavers between the deductive interest. ,  introduced 
by the stock expression "other things being equal '  f  and a 
strong human and realistic interest,  introduced by the ex­
pression "but in real l ife". The latter considerations, in 
many cases, apparently destroy the "ideal" tendencies of the 
earlier analysis. But issues of general methodology are 
only relevant for us as they serve to distinguish the opera­
tive ethical interest and criterion. First,  we shall view 
an earlier work, written in 19^5» entitled Principles and 
Methods of Industrial Peace. We shall only sketch so much 
of the central wage thesis as will tend to clarify the ethi­
cal criterion apparently assumed as valid. 
Pigou declares, in the analytical table of contents, 
that "the problem of this book is ethical—to determine what 
principles and methods ought to be employed in the settle­
ment of industrial differences, rather than to describe 
those which are employed". This promises an analytical ex­
position of the ethical criterion to be employed, but the 
implied promise is not fulfilled. Though this work is in 
the optative moo'd, Pigou does not deem i t  necessary to enter 
"those fundamental controversies in which the science of the 
84 
good is involved". 
The strenuous debate still raging as to the topography 
of that promised land has not proved incompatible with 
agreement as to the general direction in which it lies from 
our present habitations. The question, whether or not such 
and such a change would be an improvement on the existing 
state of things, is often answered in the same way by think­
ers whose fundamental doctrines are quite irreconcilable 
with one another. Thus, if only a scheme were found by 
vhich rich and poor could be bound together in closer unity, 
all schools of thought would welcome that result; and their 
agreement in this is sufficient for our purpose, even though 
they immediately dispute as to whether it  is good because it 
makes men happier, or because it is a step towards the moral 
union of the Kingdom of God.^ 
Pigou decides to remain "upon the surface of things, 
accepting the social system as he finds it,  and making no 
attempt to pierce beneath those media axiomata of conduct 
with which common sense is content". On the other hand 
"concrete economic analysis---is the instrument of know­
ledge, by which the leading part must be played",2 Pigou 
pays his respects to an extensive literature on his subject 
and conceives his contribution as unique i .e. to view modern 
devices for promoting industrial peace "comprehensively in 
the light of an end". ITo further analytical attention is 
paid to the "end", other than the quotation given above. 
This end, then, by definition, is to bring rich and poor in­
to closer unity. This is apparently the ethical criterion 
of Pigou fs economic analysis. The relevant comment for us 
to make is that vague ethical principles are probably always 
1 A. C. .figou, Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, 4. 
2 Ibid., 3-
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implied in economic wage analysis. As we shall see through­
out Pigou's work, the meliorative practical bearings of his 
arguments are characteristically present. We have in Pigou's 
earlier work, however, "the admission that this practical 
character of his wage analysis rests on an ethical interest 
and criterion; later he seeks to qualify this concession. 
How does Pigou's apparent ethical criterion operate in 
his theory of wages? Does he give the criterion a more de­
tailed expression? It is obviously necessary to review some 
preliminary matters before these questions can be faced 
squarely. Wages (for Pigou) should fluctuate around the 
"normal" wage level. This is the long-range standard that 
deductive marginal analysis discovers. Its rough practical 
expression is "equal pay for equal efficiencies". So far, 
this form of analysis is congenial to Clark's determination 
of the wage point on the theory of marginal substitution. 
"Other things being equal" (argues Pigou) equal efficiencies 
will be rewarded by equal pay. But this analysis has an ex­
plicitly realistic and ethical twist, which makes the mar­
ginal deduction of an ideal wage rate a bare introduction. 
The essential and extended part of the analysis is taken up 
with qualifications from the short-range standpoint i.e. 
practicable wage policy in actual cases. The deductive an­
alysis, it seems, serves as an ideal standard which assigns 
statistical work some severe tasks. In other words, the de­
ductive marginal worker determines the wages of his capacity-
class, and since this rate bears some relation to a subsis-
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tence or efficiency level, we have the principle that the 
general level of efficiency wages determines the "normal" 
wage in actual cases- (Pigou quotes Marshall and Clark as 
authorities on this position*) But this "actual" level is a 
statistical finding of great complexity. Pigou enters these 
problems in a rather tentative fashion; he indicates a 
"rough" practical method: some year, recognized as normal, 
is arbitrarily chosen, and the wage of that base year is ad-
Justed by an index of the change in the general wage level to 
date.1 The objective, then, is to provide "real" (effective) 
wages which conform to an efficiency level in the given econ­
omic conditions. 
The deductive principle, we should remember, that or­
ders this statistical investigation is that, "other things 
being equal", wages should conform to the "normal" level in 
respect to the oscillations of supply and demand. Statisti­
cal indices that are helpful in actually realizing this 
mechanically conceived adjustment, are "prices", "margins", 
"output", and "profits". All these indices should be used, 
and checked against each other, to obtain an approximation 
of accuracy. In the background of this argument is the 
clear recognition of the conflicts of the "ideal" rate with 
the irrational factors of actual cases, v/ages "should con­
form to the deductive analysis of marginal equilibrium of 
supply and demand. But Pigou is very aware of the practical 
1 A.C. Pigou, Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, 
59-61. 
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qualifications that should "be made in actual cases. The 
"natural" (long—range competitive) solution of wage diffi­
culties would he the best in a world of economic harmony. 
The "ethical" interest of Pigou, then, is close to actual 
industrial conflicts of employer and employee. He seeks an 
adaptation of a priori wage mechanics in the interest of a 
closer unity of rich and poor i.e. industrial peace. And 
here Pigou gives his ethical criterion a biological turn of 
great interest to us. 
In the last resort, however, mechanical analogies must 
give place to biological. For, an artificially increased 
wage rate may indirectly influence the quality and general 
efficiency of work-people. In these circumstances,an ad­
vance in their fortune, artificially secured, need not in­
volve a decline in the demand of capital and employing power 
for their services .-----T&'ith increased nourishment, leisure, 
and so forth, the work done may gradually become a different 
commodity, really worth the higher wage. In short, the bio­
logical law of functional adaptation supervenes upon the 
mechanical laws of equilibration.-^ (Italics added) 
JTevertheless, Pigou forcibly expresses the deductive play of 
demand and supply which "tends" to destroy wages above the 
normal point of equilibration. At the same time, "i_n—real 
life", he is on ethical guard to locate practicable, short-
range principles which tend to equate the status of rich and 
poor. The "biological law" is an interesting ethical tool 
which satisfies this realistic bent. 
Pigou wrote The Economics of Welfare in 19^9* The ex 
tended discussion of economic method and scope makes no ex 
1 A. C. Pigou, Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace,47. 
i i ! ; i 
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: 
plicit reference, as before, to the term "ethical".1 Econ- | j : 
omics is conceived as a "science", "qualitative" at present, j 
but with a "quantitative" ideal. The economist adds "some-
{ 
thing" to his description of economic mechanics, because his j 
science is the basis of an art of economic control. This 
personal "something", which the economist adds to his des-
! criptions of economic structures, originates in the "motive" 
I of economic study, which is to "help social improvement". 
Economic reasoning per se, however, does not indicate what 
ought to be done. Economics is a scienoe which is the basis 
' of an art; it is not itself an art. The exclusive criterion 
of economic reasoning is quantitative—so far as present 
j statistical data and methods will permit. 
j 
Certain assumptions of probability are made by Pigou 
| with reference to the influence of "economic welfare" upon 
j "total welfare". Economic welfare includes only those sat-
I isfactions and dissatisfactions which can be measured in the 
j monetary unit. The technical meaning of economic welfare is 
I contained in the conception of the "national dividend" i.e. 
j social net income. Pigou's study centers upon the causes 
which affect the size and distribution of the national divi-
| dend. Causes which affect "size" do not necessarily influ­
ence "distribution" in an advantageous way. It is.taken as 
probable that courses of conduct which increase the size of 
the dividend, and which tend to increase the proportion of 
1 a. c. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, 1-126. 
the dividend going to the poor, are economically sound and 
affect total welfare for the "better, Economics is, then, a 
"realistic" study which aims at generalizations ("light") as 
But economics is alsot indirectly, interested in "fruit" i.e. 
in providing laws which may guide business men and statesmen 
in problems of economic control. 
Enough has been said, perhaps, to suggest that the 
practical interest is as strong here as in the earlier work. 
Conclusions of Pigou's economic analysis apparently proceed 
in terms of a desirable course of conduct because that con­
duct will tend to increase the national dividend--or tend to 
increase the relative proportion of the dividend going to 
the poor—in the long run. The transition from mechanical 
quantitative analysis to principles of economic guidance is, 
it seems, constantly made. The conclusions are apparently 
normative, as they were (explicitly) in the earlier book. 
Yet Pigou does not choose to call the later treatment 'ethi­
cal" , as he did the earlier one. The phase of "description" 
of economic mechanics is now stressed in the conception of 
economics laid down. However, in the earlier work, "con-
In truth, it is difficult to see a change in essential meth 
4 asserted to do the major work crete economic analysis was 
ethical criterion in the two books. The redef-od, scope or ethi 
, debt to Marshall is apparent. As we 
Marshall probably allows more ethical 
inition of economics as -science- has apparently not altered 
the normative character of the reasoning in the final analy­
sis. Pigou is still eloquent in his insistence that the 
economist "helps social improvement". The adaptation of 
mechanical reasoning to qualitative problems of control is 
always at the front of his attention. Then, too, the proba­
ble enhancement of total (non-economic) welfare is persis­
tently affirmed, when a course of economic conduct is "ad­
vised" . 
We may now turn to the most attractive wage analysis in 
the recent book for our purposes, viz. "unfair wages". Only 
so much wage doctrine will be developed as promises to dis­
close the ethical criterion apparently assumed as valid. At 
the same time, we shall test the character of the economic 
analysis from the standpoint of this transition. 
Pigou accepts a marginal productivity theory of wages. 
As we saw in the case of Clark's mature analysis it appears, 
at first, to be folly to go very far in imputing an effect­
ive ethical criterion within the deductive structure of this 
theory.1 Are we justified in reasoning from the assumption 
of free competition alone to an (individualistic) ethical 
criterion? Apparently not, for the deductive mechanics of 
marginal reasoning may be engaged in by analysts of varying 
1 Clark's specific productivity theory of wages is, of 
course, to be distinguished from his final productivity 
theory. The comparison refers to the latter (liarshallian) 
type of marginal analysis. 
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ethical standpoints; i t  is,  therefore, more illuminating of 
the true ethical interest to study ulterior uses of the mar­
ginal analysis. As we saw in studying Clark, however, the 
assumption of pure competition, even if only for the time 
being, includes a characteristic ethical assumption. Wages, 
accepting the marginal productivity theory of value, are 
"fair" or "just" when they equal the marginal product of the 
same-quality producer. This deductive analytics undoubtedly 
becomes an ethics when used as a criterion of judgment of 
the "good" character of wage conduct. What was, at  first 
sight, purely financial analysis, takes on an ethical bear­
ing when the "justice" of a wage payment is claimed. There­
fore, the narrow quantitative motives of the marginal analy­
sis appear to grow into ethical proportions when the analy­
sis is used as a tool in ques"""* of practical import.  
What appears as folly of imputation within the marginal an­
alysis, becomes sensible in the total situation. 
The above reasoning (it  is hoped) explains the attrac 
tion of Pigou's analysis of "unfair wages" for our purposes. 
Provided that the wages paid to workpeople in all  Pea­
ces and occupations were equal to the values of t  
net product of their work--and provided that the ^istribu 
tion of all  grades of workpeople among diff>er^ ® ,  
occupations were ideal,--subject to the existe 
differences in the cost of l iving, therewouldbe estab­
lished between different people's wages a certain relation. 
This relation I define as fair".1  
"Pair" wages means, then, that,  as between persons of the 
same grade, there should be equality of real wages. In an 
^ A. C. Pigou, gconomics of Welfare, 5^9* 
92 
industry wages are "fair", relative to industries in gener­
al,  when (quoting Marshall) "they are about on a level with 
the payment made for tasks in other trades which are of 
equal difficulty and disagreeableness, which require equal 
natural abilities and an equally expensive training". Real 
wages should be proportioned to efficiency; "the efficiency 
of a worker being measured by his net product conceived as 
marginal,  multiplied by the price of that product".1  The 
analysis then takes this form: under what circumstances is 
"interference" with wages a benefit to the national divi­
dend? 
The problem of most interest to us Pigou describes as 
"exploitation". In this analysis i t  is assumed that the 
marginal net product is sufficient to pay "fair" wages but 
that the employer holds back part of the product. "If per­
fectly free competition prevailed everywhere, the wage rate 
paid by any employer in any occupation would be determinate 
at a definite point".^ But ignorance, and costs of move­
ment, introduce a monopoly element into the wage bargain. 
There is a "range of indeterminateness", a gap between the 
worker's minimum and the employer's maximum rate. The stra~ 
tegic strength of the employer tends to make this range a 
wide one "in real l ife". Strong trade unions tend to equal-
A. C. Pigou, JHconomics of V/elfare. 5^9* 
2  ibid..  557. 
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l  
ize the respective "bargaining powers. However, in real 
l ife, the poor and ignorant or the economically weak ("women 
and children") are subject to exploitation—unless the em­
ployer is deterred by "feelings of generosity and kindli­
ness".  ̂  
We must now view another aspect of the argument. 
Thus i t  appears prima facie that,  though t h e  abolition 
of this type of unfairness would presumably benef i t  economic 
welfare as a whole by preventing the relatively rich f r o™ 
taking money from the relatively poor, Jt  would make no dif­
ference to the magnitude of the national dividend.J 
That is to say, "directly" i t  does not appear that exploita­
tion upsets the most advantageous distribution of labor. 
But the analysis then traces the "indirect" effects of ex­
ploitation on the national dividend. By this course of 
reasoning the ethical criterion (which strives to bring the 
poor and rich into closer unity; is vindicated. One indi­
rect effect (Pigou argues) is that some workers may see 
their disadvantageous position and move away, thus the mar 
ginal net product goes still  higher, while the wage rate is 
static. Since this involves a disadvantageous distribution 
of labor, the national dividend is injured. Again, some em­
ployers specialize on squeezing their employees at the ex­
pense of possible rationalization of their factories. "To 
1 7'P 1 fare .  The recurrence of 
1  this ' tmequal « »'  
studying is noteworthy. 
2  rb id . ,  560 .  These "feelings" are far from negligible in 
importance for Pigou. 
3 Ibid.,  560. 
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prevent them from seeking profit along the line of bargain­
ing power indirectly impel3 them to seek it along that of 
technical improvement". Still another indirect effect is 
that the exploiting employers may "receive more than the 
normal earnings of persons of their degree of competence".1 
If the exploiting employers were persons of the ordi­
nary competence of their grade, interference, which forced 
up the wages paid by them to a fair level, would simply com­
pel them to hand over to workpeople profits formerly ex- ^ 
tracted by force majeure, and would have no other effect. 
The point of this quotation is that exploitation provides a 
bounty, at the workers expense, for relatively incompetent 
employers. An interference to raise wages to the fair level 
would hasten the defeat of these incompetents. Considering 
all of these "indirect" effects, it is plain "that external 
interference to prevent that type of unfair wages which I 
have described as exploitation is desirable in the interest 
of the national dividend as well as upon other grounds".3 
(Italics added) 
The biological standpoint has been implicitly operative 
in these considerations.- V«'e have seen hovr the ethical cri 
terion (to bring about unity of rich and poor, set the po 
tion that was validated by the analysis o. indirect effect 
on the "social net income" (national dividend). These lat­
ter arguments depended on showing that interference to raise 
wages would mean an improvement in distribution of labor 
1 A. C. Pigou, £conoraic3 of V-elfare, $6l-^. 
2 ibid., 563. Cf. Hobson's analysis of "surplus . 
3 Ibid., 563-
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(and so -vragea )--and these arguments, in turn, rest on a bio­
logical base* 
For improved distribution is likely to modify the pro­
portion in which future generations are born form richer and. 
poorer classes respectively. A considerable correlation 
exists between poverty and "bad" original properties. 
Hence, i t  would seem an improvement in the distribution of 
the dividend may be expected actually to diminish the pro­
portion of children born from inferior stocks.1  
Hence, improved distribution makes for economic and general 
welfare i .e.  closer unity of rich and poor.2  
Pigou expresses his wage views in more popular fashion 
in a book on Unemployment, f irst published in 1913* T h e  
reasoning, to begin with, assumes a "perfectly stationary-
state" and strives to show that unemployment follows artifi­
cial maintainance of wages above that level which the free 
play of economic forces (demand and supply) tends to bring 
about. For, if  (as is the case in real l ife) some workerB 
are not worth the minimum wage, or the wage demanded by 
trade unions, the result is that this large group of workers 
cannot find employment. Industrial efficiency cannot sup­
port payment of wages above that level which the unimpeded 
play of supply and demand fixes. The essential opportunity 
f o r  i m p r o v e m e n t  i s  a  p r o g r a m  o f  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  t r a i n i n g  f o r  
the lowest grade of workers. Only by improving their quali­
ty of work can the demand for this increased industrial ef­
ficiency be invoked. Pigou seeks in these principles the 
1  A. C. Pigou, Fconomios of Welfare, 1^2-3. 
2  Ibid.,  124. 
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"cold clarity of science", yet he is eloquent in his ctate-
ment of the motives and emotions that lead to the restrained 
"method of science". 
The only way in which it is possible to contrive meas­
ures of social improvement that shall be free fron this 
great danger (i.e. the neutralisation of immediate good ef­
fects by wider causes) is to found them uvon a close and 
thorough study of economic life as a whole.- If the "art" of 
social°reform is to be effective, the basis of it must be 
laid in a "science". Resentment at the evils investigated 
must be controlled, lest it militate against scientific ex­
actitude in our study of their causes.1 (Parenthetical in­
sert added)• 
The controlling ideal is that wages should be "plastic" i.e. 
conform to all changes in supply of and demand for labor. 
Any "rigidity" is a cause of unemployment. The moot satis­
factory relations between employers and employed exist .hen 
there are no artificial protections of the employees, 
ers should earn all they get. All a worker should b. paid 
is the price of his labor-power on the labor market at the 
equilibrium of supply and demand, qualifications 
absolute standard are palliatives of local and transient 
effect. These relief measures are sometimes immediately ad­
visable but. their ultimate (theoretical) effects destroy the 
narrow advantages realized. In the long run. wages must be 
allowed to follow the detailed determinations of market con­
ditions. Scientific insight shows that the price system 
should not be artificially controlled. A sound « 
• the efficiencies of workers, so 
centers attention on raising 
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that free competition will afford adequate pay to maintain 
and advance a standard of living requisite to the needed in­
dustrial efficiency. A true economic ethics does not give 
without adequate return. Since pay is according to ability 
to produce under the given wage market conditions, a true 
economic ethics focuses attention on the education and 
training necessary to correlate pay and the standards of ca­
pacity necessary to earn that pay. The only economically 
sound remedies of industrial fluctuations are those which 
enable a worker to give value received for his wages under 
competitive market relations. The worker must realize his 
competitive situation and improve himself accordingly. He 
must see the profit and loss situation of his employer, and 
fit himself into the requirements of that system. His wage 
attitude must be impersonal—he must understand and abide by 
the price rules and fit himself to strike a free bargain 
which satisfies the requirements of industrial exchange and, 
at the same time, gives him an earned return adequate to his 
standard of living. 
The dogmatic flavor of this account is distinctly 
teresting. If the point of view we have just summarized 
were carried out, without qualification, m rigou 
theoretical analyses, his full alignment with classical 
^ Aiear, For in this popular ac-
economic hedonism would be clear. 
count, it may readily be granted that the "education" of 
workers is extrinsic 
wa2e__rate,. Essentially, this dogmatized theory 
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grounded on Ricardian "self-inter.est" and economic laissez-
faire. The glimmer of "organic" interest is swept with leg­
islative success into non-economic provinces. But let ua 
again study Pigou as the careful theorist.  
Pigou made a study supplementary to the Economics of 
Welfare in a volume on Industrial Fluctuations. (1927* re­
vised I929J• Here we find a more technical analysis of the 
considerations just outlined. "Real" wage rates should be 
"plastic" i .e.  should move up and down according to changing 
supply and demand. I t  is irrelevant, asserts Pigou, to 
claim that the fluctuation of wage rates in response to the 
price determinations of supply and demand is "a veiled de­
vice for exploiting wage-earners in the interests of the era-
ploying class".-*- In good times, "real" wages are maintain­
able by a lowered money rate of wages i .e.  the greater buy­
ing power of the dollar enables a fewer number of dollars to 
achieve the standard of l iving formerly held by a relatively 
greater number of dollars. 
But a wage system plastic in the degree we are here 
contemplating would, on occasions, involve rates of wages 
per man so low as to be out of harmony with the moral sense 
of the time and~incompatible with our social structure; 
r3tes of wages, for example, below the rate of benefit paid 
from the Unemployment Insurance Fund to workpeople wholly 
unemployed. Plainly, as things are, a system permitting 
•wage-cuts of that magnitude must be ruled out of court as, 
in a broad sense, anti-social.2 (Italics added) 
Pigou here reveals, at least,  the conventional ethical lim-
1 A. C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations. 307. 
2  £bij '» 31 0  
r 
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I its of a rigorous competitive economics. The de facto moral 
j sense of the community {i.e. the recognized and operative 
social values) is fundamentally a rigid structure which de­
termines the lower limit of wages. Theoretically, Pigou 
plays with the extreme notion of wage plasticity e.g. in "bad 
times workers should receive "negative wages" i.e. should 
pay the employer for the privilege of working. This is, 
however, not as fantastic, according to Pigou, as it appears 
prima facie:; both employer and employee are (in our competi­
tive system) dependent on a given profit and loss situation. 
"If" the employee built up a reserve fund from his earnings 
in good times (which Pigou recognizes he does not-~or can­
not?) then, in bad times, when the worker is actually produ­
cing no return for the employer, consistent profit and loss 
economics might theoretically call for a return of previous 
wages. The use of this argument is mainly to elucidate the 
conditions of full and continuous employment under the flue-
nations of the price system. Plasticity means, when thought 
out to the bitter end, this complete identification of em­
ployer and employee in accepting the fruits and hard places 
of industrial life. Anything short of this thoroughgoing 
plasticity of wage-rates causes a condition of unemployment 
in a competitive system. 
A more practicable line of argument, perhaps, is ar­
rived at when Pigou points out the "mutual fears" that char­
acterize the relations of employer and employee and cause 
rra-ge "rigidity". Employers refuse (argues Pigou) to raise 
r 
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wages in prosperous times out of fear that they cannot he 
lowered in times of stress; employees refuse to take cuts in 
times of negligible profits out of fear that they will not 
recoup the loss when business is active. Here, surely, says 
Pigou, the fact8 point a need of a mutual good-will and 
identification of interests.1  This leads, in the last anal­
ysis, to the values and uses of collective bargaining. 
Machinery for collective bargaining may be set up, and, 
partly as cause, partly as effect of this,  a spirit  of good­
will and accomodation may be engendered. In representative 
meetings of employers and employed not only mechanical indi­
ces of prices and so on, but all  considerations relevant to 
wages, may be periodically"reviewed in a whole-hearted ef­
fort to secure a reasonable settlement. Where arrangements 
of this kind exist each side will be ready to make conces­
sions if  the conditions seem to call for them, confident 
that the other side, in converse circumstances, r i l l  do 
likewise. Wage-rates will be rendered less rigid, the am­
plitude of industrial fluctuations associated with given 
variations in demand will  be pro tanto reduced, and economic 
welfare correspondingly augmented.^ (Italics added) 
What are we justified in concluding about the ethical 
criterion apparently assumed as valid by Pigou--in wage the­
ory?  First,  the desire to bring rich and poor into closer 
unity is implicit throughout, and frequently a controlling 
factor. As a rigid deductive theorist Pigou tends to reach 
his ethical result by freeing the price system of detailed 
hindrances. Put even conventional ethical habits serve to 
impede the fully perfect oscillation of labor-price. How­
ever, the conventional social sense should not be overcome; 
1 A., C. Pigou, Industrial Fluctuations, 3^1* 
2  Ibid.,  3*3• 
such a perfection of the price system would he "contrary to 
fact". One fundamental postulate of Pigou's attitude toward 
the economic system is undoubtedly that interference should 
he gauged to free the price system—make i t  plastic—in so 
far as the social sense, habits and institutions allow. 
Thus will  "social improvement" he helped; thus will economic 
welfare (the national dividend) he increased; and thus will 
general welfare (social v. ell-being) he enhanced. Thus, 
technical economics clearly stresses the investigation of 
"qualitative" devices as nearly allied to "free quantitative 
results as possible. For Pigou, at times, the uniPipeded 
rules of the price game, will  achieve the practicable maxi­
mum of social welfare. This view assumes that the employers 
and employees are financially competent (i .e.  intelligent in 
an accounting sense) and industrially efficient.  This out­
look is akin to the theoretical laissez-faire of Clark. 
This portion of the position is apparently hedonistic indiv­
idualism. Each buyer and seller on the wage market is an 
economic calculator—in large part.  But Pigou cautiously 
qualifies this competitive mechanics of the price system 
^ rom the "biological" standpoint and, i t  appears, is less 
rigorous than the mature Clark. Pigou derived a great deal 
from Alfred Marshall,  whom v .e shall study later; like Mar­
shall,  he tends to broaden the economic motives to include 
nore than the pecuniary. He does not appear to go as far as 
his master, however. As we have seen, both employers and 
employees have mutual interests which center on the workings 
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I  o f  l abo r -p r i c e  i n  t he  marke t .  I t  i s  t o  t he i r  mu tua l  a dva n -
j t age  t o  "ge t - t oge the r "  amicab ly ;  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  i s  fu r t he r ed  
I ly t a k ing  a  t o t a l  i ndus t r i a l  a ccoun t i ng  v i ew - -a  l ong - r ange  
I  p ro f i t  and  l o s s  v i ew .  B u t  P igou  i s  a l so  t heo re t i c a l l y  i n -
j  t e r e s t ed  i n  t he  soc i a l  ang l e  e . g .  wage  po l i c i e s  s hou ld  b e  
I  cons id e r ed  a cco rd ing  t o  t he i r  e f f ec t  on  t he  na t i ona l  i nc ome ;  
t h i s ,  i n  t u rn ,  i s  fundamen ta l l y  j u s t i f i ed ,  s i nce  t he  s i z e  
j  ( a nd  d i s t r i b u t i o n )  o f  t he  na t i ona l  i ncome  a r e  economic  con ­
t r i bu to r s  t o  non -economic  soc i a l  we l l - be ing .  P i gou  appa r ­
e n t l y  t ake s  t he  compe t i t i ve  p r i c e - sy s t em fo r  g r an t ed ;  e con ­
omics ,  f o r  h im ,  i s ,  pe rhaps ,  m a i n l y  a  t heo ry  o f  p r i c e  cau ­
s e s .  Ye t ,  h i s  p r o l o g u e  i s  t he  e t h i ca l  c r i t e r i on  o f  quan t i ­
t a t i ve  ( and  s o  qua l i t a t i ve )  soc i a l  we l l - be i ng .  Though  one  
ba s i c  pos tu l a t e  i s  t ha t  t he  f r e e  work ing  o f  t he  p r i c e  sy s t em 
( i n  so  f a r  a s  c ompa t ib l e  w i th  t he  e s t a b l i s he d  soc i a l - e th i ca l  
conven t i ons )  i s  t he  de s ide r a tum o f  a l l  economic  po l i cy ,  we  
a r e  j u s t i f i ed  i n  a s se r t i ng  an  i mmanen t  e t h i ca l  qua l i f i c a t i on  
Of  c ou r se ,  P i gou  speaks  dec i s i ve ly ,  conce rn ing  t he  de s i r ab l e  
educa t i o n  o f  worke r s  t o  t he  end  o f  a  be t t e r ed  s t an d a rd  o f  
l i v i ng .  Y e t  he  co mes  c l o se ,  a t  t imes ,  t o  s ay ing  ( i n  t e c hn i ­
c a l  wage  t heo ry )  t ha t  t he  s t anda rd  o f  l i v i ng  de t e rmines  wa ­
g e s ;  howeve r ,  h i s  p r eoccu pa t i on  w i th  t he  f r e e  mechan i c s  o f  
- t he  p r i c e  sys t em a ppa r e n t l y  min imize s  t he  f o r ce  o f  t h i s  
"b io log i ca l "  s t and  i n  t he  l a s t  ana ly s i s .  When  t h i s  "b io log ­
i c a l "  r ea son ing  i s  a t  t he  f r on t ,  e t h i ca l  i n t e r e s t  i s  obv i ­
ous ly  more  t han  a  bened i c t i on ,  o r  a  p r aye r ,  o r  a  quan t i t a ­
t i ve  causa l  expec t ancy .  &e re ,  f o r  t he  momen t ,  an  immanen t  
|  theoretical interest in economic social direction is dis­
cernible. For the most part,  however, Pigou clearly co.n-
I C $ i V e B  t h e  e c c n o mic wage system as a"price institution that 
i for social well-being-if demand and supply 
are unimpeded by hindrances, frictions and contaminations. 
His analysis proceeds (for the most part) deductively (as­
suming "property" and the free working of the price systera)-
-introducing an element or two of "friction" at a time. 
Thus, for example, labor price is a function of supply and 
demand, which gives the worker what he is worth under given 
market conditions. If the supply 0f available workers is 
large, due e.g. to immigration, the labor price tends to be 
lowered. Artificial protection of the wage-earner under 
such conditions is economically unsound—though the "social 
sense" may demand a transient palliative. "In the long run", 
the efficiency of workers must f i t  the industrial price 
Eechanisra, to the end that wages are no more (and no less) 
than the free determinations of demand and supply, "in the 
long run", wages will  support the requisite industrial effi­
ciency. "This must be so", for the industrial system pays 
as i t  goes for values received—according to the conditions 
of labor demand and supply. Yet, for both employer and em­
ployee, i t  is sound price economics to speak of "my" indus­
try. The advantages and disadvantages of price determina­
tions should be shared with far-sighted identification of 
interests. Here is a narrow social ethics of the wage bar­
gain that is sound economic analysis, according to Pigou. 
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Here Is a narrow form of industrial  altruism resulting from 
insight into price fluctuations; i ts appeal is  grounded on 
long-range economic self-interest,  for if  followed by the 
industrial  partners (employer and employee) i t  would lead to 




In l88l, nine years before tbe famous Principles. Al­
fred and Mary Paley Marshall jointly issued a volume enti­
tled Tbe Economics of Industry. It was firBt conceived as a 
very elementary treatment of the "affairs of producers, both 
employers and -workmen", but was revised from a more advanced 
standpoint before publication. The previous generation had 
left a theory of wages which made "too great pretentions to 
finality"; but inquiry "tended to vindicate it". A brief 
ethical study of this early theory of wages will afford a 
fruitful introduction to Marshall's later wage analysis It 
is unnecessary for us to pause to acclaim the recognised 
inence of Alfred Marshall in economic theory. A great, loy­
al worker in the deductive tradition, it is eloquent through 
out his lucid pages that a wholejnan, of far-reaching ethi­
cal interests, speaks with genuine integrity 
nm^rietY of referine to the 
Assuming the expository propr 
ohflU fir8t sketch rapidly 
joint authors as "Marshall", we shall xir 
, Marshall H setting out to refine 
an essential background, liaren 
) of X. S. Mill- The P°ln 
the wage doctrines (among others; 
, are determined by certain rele-
of departure is that wages are 
*,t of production is the chief 
tions of demand and supply* co 
It .111 necessary to re 
cause that determines supply* .. . 
a moment but, fl«l-
turn to this cost theory of waS creat 
tition" fa 01 
Marshall's assumption of "free com 
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relevant significance. I t  seems clearly advisable to quote 
at  length. 
A man competes freely when he is  pursuing a course, 
which without entering into any combination with others,  he 
has deliberately selected as that which is  likely to be of 
the greatest material advantage to himself and his family. 
He is  not supposed to be selfish: in fact the normal sup­
ply of all  grades of industry, except perhaps the lowest,  
depends on the unselfish sacrifice by parents of their own 
pleasures for the benefit  of their children. Eut he is sup­
posed to be consulting his own material advantage and that 
of his family to the comparitive neglect of the welfare of 
others.  If  everyone always found his greatest happiness in 
trying to do that which was best for others,  the world would 
have no theory of normal values as i t_is described in thia 
volumei some such communism as that which prevailed^among 
the early Christians would be the basis of economic theory. 
But in this world, as i t  is.  the chief aotlve grlncijj£ln 
business is the desire of each man to promote the material 
interests of himself and his family, Noraal * e  fvL.t 
economics are therefore those which would be 
in the long run by this active principle,  if  I t  had 
overcome—as i t  necessarily would injUlr^Lsive'ele-
tom, inertness,  ignorance, and all  t h e 1°] 'T^ J  added) 
ments which make up economic friction. ( 
Thus the narrowly selfish "economic man becomes a y 
man" .  This is  an important development; the theoretical 
door is  apparently opened to the de facto ethical noti  
employers and employees. If  actual ethical mo 
. .  the revision of econom* 
changes fundamentally,  the proble 
ic theory is  apparently raised for Marsha 
•in this early book repudiates the 
The cost wage theory in tbi 
far as It  rests on 
conception of the wage fund theory, m 
in a static sense, in 
the idea that the fund is "set as 
Marshall 's  vi  
,  o  n f  l a n d |  capital and industry, 
iev the produce of lana, 
nf Industry, P r e" 
I- A. and M. P. Marshall ,  The_&c° talicized "passages < 
face". The virtual hedonism o; 
apparent 
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exclusive of rent and taxes, creates an "earnings-and-inter-
est fund". Interest remunerates abstinence; earnings remu­
nerate bodily or mental work. 
The normal wages of a trade are therefore determined by 
the relation in which i ts wages (or more strictly, i ts net 
advantages), must stand to those of other trades in order 
that the supply of labour in i t  may be kept up, and this de­
pends on the difficulty of the work to be done on i t ,  on the 
expensiveness of the general and special education, and on 
the natural qualities, physical,  mental and moral,  required 
in i t .  Trades in the same industrial grade generally re­
quire an equally difficult and expensive education, and hare 
equal wages. The lower the grade of a skilled occupation, 
the higher is the ratio which i ts wages bear to the expense# 
of preparing for i t . l  
Competition of supply and competition of demand (together 
with competition of supply and demand) interact with wage 
rates to keep wages near the normal level; they are then 
said to be "in equilibrium". Wages thus revolve around the 
"Standard of Comfort" to  which workers "are accustomed". 
The Standard of Comfort is J?4  i n  
But yet i t  is,  at any place and time, so J t h  Q f  p 0 ? u_ 
does exercise so great an °h 0  m e a n s  0f maintain-
lation, that the wages which afford the n o r m a l  wages of 
ing this standard may fairly be calle wages caused 
unskilled labour there and then. -A temporary, unless 
by an increased demand for labour wi t .  i n  which case 
i t  lead to a rise in the Standard of Comfort^ 
i t  will be permanent, and normal wabe 
* fnilow the technical course of I t  is not necessary to follow 
o further.  Snough has been 
this  early cost theory of wages 
•in i t  of the f |nallty of 
shown to reveal the central place 
Tho "good 
l iving required by the average w a g e-earne .  l s l t e  
(efficient) worker's l ife must be sustains 
1  A. and II.  P. Marshall,  TheJEconomics_^f„^ 
2  H>ld.-  130.  
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wage and other advantages of his work. According to tar-
shall,  the economist should reflect in his wage theory the 
effective ethical motivation of a given industrial relatlon-
B i l lP- The ethical criterion of this early wage analysis is 
apparently^ therefore, the "customary" ethical criterion 
found in the industrial context studied. We shall follow 
this tentative lead closely in Marshall 's later analysis. 
The preface to the first edition of Marshall 's Princi­
ples of Economics contains the following paragraph. Its 
clearly relevant value makes apology for lengthy quotation 
unnecessary. 
But ethical forces are among those of which the econo­
mist has to take account. Attempts have indeed "been made to 
construct an abstract science with regard to the actions of 
an "economic man", who is under no ethical influences and 
who pursues pecuniary gain warily and energetically, but 
mechanically and selfishly. But they have not been success­
ful,  nor even thoroughly carried out; for they have newer 
really treated the economic man as perfectly s elfish* Mo 
one could be relied on better than the economic man to en­
dure toil  and sacrifice with the unselfish desire to make 
provision for his family; and his normal motives have always 
been tacitly assumed to include the family affections. But 
if  these motives are included, vhv not also all  other altru­
stic motives, the arf.inn nf which i:n so far unliorm in_any 
class at any time and place, that i t  can he reduced to a 
general rule? There seems to be no good reason agains 
eluding them: and in the present book normal action is w 
en to be that which may be expected, under certain corndi-
t ions, from the members of an industrial group; no 
tempt is made to exclude the influence of any motives, ino 
action of which is regular, merely because they are a ^ 
t ic.  if  the book has any special character of i  -ives 
Eay perhaps be said to lie in the prominence which i t  b 
to this and other applications of the principle of c^nnnu 
tty.-1- (Italics added) 
1  A. Marshall,  P r i n c i p l e s  of Economics,  XIV. 
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XV. r^noiDle of continuity means, for 
In wage theory the principf 
omnptition is an unwarranted assump-
one thing, that £ure competition 
V » » does not taiow everything about the mar-
tion. A worker e.g. doe 
- the rigid assumption of free competi-
ket for his labor—anc the rig 
i "arshall conceives his contr 
tion implied this knowledge. -
+ -he in this realm of reali8tic__con-
bution to wage theory to i,rrtrp 
•p + *»nrti tional theory, bore 
ditioning of the rigid edges o 
particularly, he see**, as before, to render more exact 
more complete and more homogeneous the doctrines o 
Kill. 
Tc hegill with, the general .age principle Is ha e 
"wages of any wor*er~tend to equal the net produc . 
labour".1 *et P-»cts depend on "marginal uses w hi 
.a bv the relations of demand and supply, 
are, in turn, governed decrease 
The loss of the marginal sorter would result 
of'the net output about equal to the wages of that m rgi 
sorter. This theory employs the notion of "inorement f 
sort of the same standard, in arriving at a marginal J 
•» further exposition to the 
x- ~ 2 we shall confine our further of wages. we 8Ildli ^ 
character of the ethical criterion involved in this wag 
analysis. 
"he economic issue for Marshall is: "hat payEen 
be required to produce an adequate supply of labor of any 
grade? This payment (he reasons) will bear a close re a i 
1 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, 538* 
2 Marshall was a "marginal" pioneer, Plgou carries on. 
trast Clark's "specific adaptation. 
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to the education required; and the physical, cental and cor­
al characters which must be sustained. In working out de­
ductive principles, which define the tendencies of wage pay-
cents, the economist regards man inductively "as he is»-
"a man of flesh and blood". This can "is largely influenced 
by egoistic motives in his business life"; and he is "nei­
ther above vanity and recklessness, nor below delight in do­
ing his work well for Its own sake, or m sacrificing him 
self for the good of his family, his neighbors, or his coun­
try, a man who is not below tbe love of a virtuous life for 
i *• ovo "concerned chiefly with 
its own sake". But economists are 
^ in which the action of motive is so 
those aspects of life in wmcn 
an'1 the estimate of motor-
regular that it can he predicted, 
1+0 "• they therefore study 
forces can be verified by result — »• 
„ that are meas-
"man's conduct under the influence o 
1 
urable by a money price • 
The less then we ""^^"""nsideratio/comes within 
quiries as to whether a certain con ^ ̂  „,atter is impcr-
the scope of economics, far as we can. If it * 
tant let us take accoun^1-K+ divergent opinions, such as 
one as to which there exist div^^  well.asCertained 
not be brought to the <.e Y/hich the general machinery-
knowledge; if it 13 °n® asoning cannot get any grip, t 
economic analysis and reasenine ec0nOmic studies. But 
let us leave it aside i . attempt to include i w 
let us do so simply because ctneas of our eco?omlc, 
lessen the certainty and t gain; and remembering a 3^-
led^e without any commensurate g 
that some sort 
instincts and our ck n o w X e d ^ o b ^ r  
ters come to 
tained and arranged by 
1 A. Marshall, Frinciplg^_£l-^cnnomiCS» ?* 
^ Ibid., 27-8. 
We should study closely the relations of "efficiency" 
("conventional necessaries", the "standard of life") and wa­
ges. For Marshall, no simple answer concerning these rela­
tions can be true; the facts are too complex. With this 
proviso, the following tendencies may be noted: 1. An in­
crease of wages (under wholesome conditions) tends to in­
crease the strength (physical, mental and moral) of the ris­
ing generation. 2. Under given conditions of knowledge, so­
cial and domestic habits, labor tends to have an appropriate 
supply-price. 3. A relevant level of demand-price will tend 
to keep labor stationary. 4. A higher price tends to cause 
labor to increase.* 
Capital and labor thus cooperate in the production of 
the national dividend; their earnings measure their respect­
ive (marginal) efficiencies. This mutual dependence of cap­
ital and labor is very close; "the prosperity of each is 
bound up with the strength and activity of the other".2 The 
flow of the products of labor, aided by capital, determines 
the flow of wages. Wages must maintain the standard of ef­
ficiency set by the marginal producer. This standard is a 
complex function of the given standards of comfort and life. 
Since the flow of products is a function of the relevant ef­
ficiencies of capital and labor, the wage payment is intim­
ately correlated with the requisites of labor efficiency in 
the given circumstances. 
* A. Marshall, Principles of Economics. 532. 
2 ibid., 532. 
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Two quotations will serve to clarify the importance of 
actual ethical interests for Marshall's wage theory. 
The tendency then of economic freedom and enterprise 
(or, in more common phrase, of competition) to cause every­
one s earnings to find their own level,  is a tendency to 
tonJ y  o f  e f f iciency-earnings in the same district. This 
;eJcy will be the stronger, the greater is the mobility 
vL ? ' t h e  l e s s  strictly specialized it is,  the more 
~ ^ rents—are on the lookout for the most advantageous 
irrPri—?-8 5°5 *he ir  ch l ldren- the  mnr* rsrniy tH^ — • 
and l  t h®m s e l T e s  to changes in economic conditions, 
«a xastly the slower and the less violent these changes 
rrlrl-"r" --any change that awards to the workers of one 
ties nfXSl f  earnings, together with better opportunl-
their best quali tijes^wlll increase tne 
~|5ml_5.nd moral advantages which they have the newer ~ 
—i -=~a£ to their chil • wHii. v, T ,  _ - .  — -while by increasing n in-
to some extent3  m  a n d  f°5e t h o uSh t .  such a change will also 
own pleasures fo^the^i i *"•w i l l*n&£e s s  to sacrifice their 
there is much of that Inr s  0 1  their children; though 
classes, so fa? a^tL^? Te n  a m o n g  t h  e poorest 
ledge will allow? t h S  l l n l t s  ° f  «"*' know-
Harshall describes the ethical character of his wage 
analysis as the deduction of sound economic reasons for 
"economic chivalry" in raising wages.3 J n  t h a  l o n £ .  r u n  
Petitive interactions will tend to correlate higher wag 
and relevant efficiency, the terms of .  .  
tion incrlnd 
.effective ethical motdToo 
Marshall included a not<=> r,w •» 
economics and ethics" in 
*" "ook Industry and_Trade (1919) 4 w 
- We Shall quote preg-
„ * M a r 3 h a l l» Principles of Economics, 549^ 
X t > *  ̂ 2 ~ 3 >  c o m p a r e  P i g o u ' s  " b i n i n  -
3iMd., 689. Klolosical adaptation". 
c on­
es 
4 Wage problems are exm 
381? fitted. Cf. A. Karshall, 
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nant excerpts in order to illustrate a characteristic ethi­
cal "open mind" on the level of economic theory. The appar­
ent caution of Clark and Pigou in the premises cannot detain 
us here. 
To the scientific group belong retrospective statements 
in the indicative mood, as to the causes which have been 
(certainly or probably; operative in bringing about past e-
ventsj and prospective statements, also in the indicative 
mood, as to the results which may be expected (certainly or 
probably) to follow from the action of specified causes. 
On the other hand, expressions of sentiment or desire in the 
optative mood, as to the relative claims of different social 
aims, must necessarily rest in the main on the personal 
authority of individuals* Again, it may be suggested 
that, though the rigid rights of private property, which 
prevail under the present social order, may justly claim to 
have done a great and necessary work; yet human nature has 
now so far developed, that social benefit would result from 
some s oftening of these rights in such ways as would promote 
the more equal distribution of wealth. Now such a proposal 
offers scope for turning to account the stores of knowledge 
and scientific apparatus, that have been accumulated by 
economic science; and therefore there is a certain obvious 
convenience and appropriateness in its being discussed from 
the special point of view of the economist. Economic stu­
dies are not to be limited to matters, which are amenable to 
strictly scientific treatment.1 
What, then, is the ethical criterion apparently assumed 
as valid by Marshall in wage theory? The de facto and ef­
fective ethics of employers and employees is apparently a 
central factor. It seems clear that (for Marshall) the mar­
ginal wage bargain, which sets the class wage rate, is con­
summated in a conventional ethical context of technical im­
portance to the theory. In so far as either employer or em­
ployee gains an advantage at the other's expense, the ten­
dency to a normal equilibrium of supply and demand will, in 
1 A. Marshall, Industry and Trade. 67-6. 
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the long run.,  tend to "bring the wage "back to the normal 
(marginal) rate i .e.  to the level of an appropriate standard 
of l iving. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal efficien­
cies" thus contains an essential ethical meaning. The flex­
ible, realistic, relative, structure of this customary ethi­
cal criterion is apparently assumed as valid in Marshall 's 
wage analyses. Whatever human interests may be counted upcr* 
in a particular context of wage bargains, to determine effi­
ciency, will in the long run be influential in determining 
the wage level.  But, furthermore, the cycle of interaction 
of a desirable standard of living and an improvable efficierv 
cy constitutes the ethical principle of growth of Marshall 's 
wage theory. 
In stressing the evolutionary structure of Marshall 's 
ethical criterion, we deny no attribution of virtual hedon­
ism to the "family man". It  has seemed more fundamental to 
emphasize the possible ethical breadth of Marshall 's wage 
theory--on its own terms. 
Deeper still ,  perhaps, is the implicit moral zeal—al­
most religious—of Marshall 's attitude. His human concern 
(e.g. for the "coming generation") evidences a vigorous 
ethical interest,  which makes "ethical custom" creative and 
prospective—not alone mechanical and retrospective.1  Here 
1  Cf. J.  M. Keynes, "Alfred Marshall,  l842-192^" in Memor­
ials of Alfred Marshall,  6-12, Kacmillan, 1925* A mis-
sionary he remained all  his l ife "(7)* '"^He second self 
sought knowledge for i ts own sake; the first self subor­
dinated abstract aims to the need for practical advance­
ment". (12) 
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rlsewhere in these studies) i t  appears that the ethical 
irion in wage theory is,  in the last analysis, the char-
istic human interest of the theorist,  which must be 




In Karl Marx we find the socialistic leanings of Hobson 
carried, apparently, to revolutionary proportions•, and the 
institutional investigations of Yiteh.ll  and Vehlen seem to 
achieve the heights of metaphysical,  necessity. The basic 
presuppositions of economists like Clark, Marshall and Pigou 
are clearly challenged. Indeed, In so far as the economists 
we have so far studied are inclined to reforms within the 
orbit of "capitalistic rights", their baaio positions are 
attacked. But wider reflections must be held in abeyance in 
this essay as v/e travel swiftly to the character of Mark 
ethical criterion in wage analysis* 
That an ethical position does animate Marx's elaborate 
* The Hobsonian die-economic analysis there can be no aouov. 
turn that "economics is ethics" receives almost cosmic e p 
sis.  It  might, indeed, be possible to sum up the 
„ i«ethics of labor ,  
scholarly economic erudition of Marx as a n  
but we shy at unnecessary dogmatism* ^T® s e  ^ 
.f +vip ethical cri — 
tory, then specific, contextual evidence 
terion operative in Marxian wage theory, a S  
inns to view the 
It  would, be the gravest of misapprehend 
Marxian ethical  position as an o v e r-night, wholesale  panacea. 
His "revolutionary" ethical character is suggeste 
Program« 
following passages from nrltlclsmj>jL^ — fTrs^ 
B^t these shortcomings are unavoidable in the 
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phase of communist s o c i e t y  after a long and painful travail.  
Right can never he on a higher level than the economic state 
of society and the stage of social civilization conditioned 
by i t .  In a higher phase of communist society, after the 
enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of 
labor shall have disappeared, and with i t  the antagonism be­
tween intellectual and manual labor, after labor has become 
not only a means of l ife but also the primary necessity of 
l ifej when, with the development of the individual in every 
sense, the productive forces also increase and all  the 
springs of collective wealth flow with abundance—only then 
can the limited horizon of bourgeois right be left behind 
entirely and society inscribe upon i ts banner: 'From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'l^-
According to Marx, the slow transition to a communist 
society is a study in the dialectic of history, an under-^ 
standing of the inevitable genesis of social institutions. 
Some contemporary followers of Marx discount his framework 
of German idealism and throw his economic ethics into instru­
mentalist terminology.2  Perhaps the ethical criterion oper­
ative in Marx's analysis of capitalist wage theory may (some­
what) be dissociated from his. metaphysics. 
Before making our wage inquiry, we must distinguish the 
pervasive character of Marx's "labor theory of value" from 
his more limited "theory of capitalist wages". We shall on­
ly treat the former as i t  enters into the latter,  more re­
stricted consideration. For, as elsewhere, we do not under­
take a broader view of economic theory than arises in wage 
analysisf and we further compress our attention to wage the­
ory in terms of relevant ethical attractiveness. 
Marx's labor theory of value" is warp and woof of his 
jfarl Marx. Selections by Max Eastman, 2-7. 
2 lbid.,  Cf• "Introduction"• 
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deductive architecture. It  is at once an economic and ethi­
cal theme that enters into the "being of every part of his 
system; and into the total meaning of his theoretical and 
practical position. We cannot help, then, but see this pos­
tulate at work in the "theory of capitalist wages", for i t  
is the elaborated premise of the entire system. Stated as a 
"self-evident" principle, the "labor theory of value" claims 
that labor (and time) constitute the full value of economic 
products. Contrary to orthodox economists, the position is 
taken that the "other" factors of production are determined 
by labor (and time). This premise purports to be at once 
explanatory and decisively critical of the "capitalistic 
phase of exchange". The inherent defect of the capitalist 
regime, on this view, is the inevitable prostitution of res­
idual surpluses which labor "values in exchange" make possi­
ble. Capitalist exchange cannot help but pile up enormous 
wealth in a few hands, since'the exclusive possessors of the 
means of production (determined by past labor) find them­
selves the fortunate recipients of the "profits" which the 
exploitative scheme of capitalistic exchange entails.  This 
bare reference to the exhaustive implications of the "labor 
theory of value" must suffice, for we turn at once to the 
narrower ethical features of the wage-bargain. 
Assuming that i t  is understood how the value of commod­
i t ies is constituted solely "by the human labor contained in 
them, we are, first,  to consider Uarx's analysis of the pur— 
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chase and sale of labor power. The general problem is to 
discover how i t  is possible for the employer to obtain from 
his commodities a greater value than that invested by him in 
them.1  To begin with, value is created by socially necess-
ary labor. "Value", here, means values in use for others 
i .e.  social values in use. "Socially necessary" means the 
expenditure of such working time as i t  required for produc­
ing a value in use under existing normal conditions of pro­
duction and with the average amount of skill  and intensity 
prevalent at the time.3 How, in order to produce a commod­
ity, certain creations of past labor are subjected to newly 
performed labor. "Wages" are paid by the employer for the 
labor "performed". But, is the value which has been newly 
created by the work necessarily identical with the value 
paid by the employer in the shape of wages? The following 
argument aims to show that the value paid in wages (value in 
exchange) ia leas than the value created by the work. Here 
we are to find, according to Karx, the sole origin of sur­
plus-value} surplus is (it  seems) peculiar to the capitalis­
tic wage-bargain and is not a character (as with Hobson) of 
bargains of a wide variety of alignments.^ 
K. Karx, Capital,  A Critique of Political Economy, (Trans­
lation by 3den and Cedar Paul),  I69-I77. 
2  Ibid..  576-580. 
3 Ibid..  190-191. 
4  Ibid.. .  177-193. 
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But it is true, agrees Marx, that in the normal case 
the capitalist employer pays the full value (in exchange) of 
what he purchases for his purposes. Why is this true? The 
capitalist purchases the workers "faculty" or "power of 
working". This power is offered on the market "by a "free 
person" as a commodity (i.e. an external object, which by 
reason of its qualities satisfies some sort of human want).^ 
Both prospective employer and employee meet as proprietors 
of commodities with equal rights i.e. as legally equal per­
sons, The labor-power commodity is for sale for a specified 
length of time? but why? The worker has no commodities for 
sale in which his labor is already incorporated. The pro­
ductive conditions are such that he owns none of the means 
of production and has only his "living body" to offer during 
so much vorking time. The worker is likewise in need of the 
bare elements of subsistence; he is "free", therefore, from 
everything necessary to utilise his labour power. But this 
productive condition is not a "natural" one (for Marx) nor 
indeed a social one, in the sense of being common to all 
periods of history. It is the result of historical develop­
ment; the product of numerous economic revolutions i.e. the 
disappearance of a number of older forms of social produc­
tion.2 
Before the questions just raised may be given more ada-
1 K. Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, 3-5^* 
2 353-390. 
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quate attention, we should pause to stress (with Marx) how 
the value of labor-power i3 determined—substantially. Like 
other commodities, labor-power is valued by the working-time 
necessary for its production (or re-production). A peculi­
arity of labor-power, however, is that it is a vital capac­
ity; therefore, the worker must have, at least, necessaries 
of existence. In the last analysis, then, the (efficient) 
working-time required for the production of adequate neces­
saries (appropriate sustenance) is the value of the given 
labor-power. The more elementary core of thi3 position may 
be seen in the following passage. 
The labour process, resolved into its simple elementary 
factors, is, as we have seen purposive activity carried on 
for the production of use-values, for the fitting of natural 
substances to human wants; it is the general condition 
uisite for effecting an exchange of matter between man and 
nature; it is the condition perennially imposed by nature 
upon human life, and is therefore independent of the forms 
of social life--or, rather, is common to all social 
—--When we study the labour process, it does not itself 
tell us under what conditions the process is carried ona 
Whether under the lash of the overseer of slaves, or under 
the sharp eyes of the capitalist; whether a Cincinnatua is 
conducting the labour process by tilling his little farm, 
or whether a savage is slaughtering a wild beast with 
stones.1 
We are now, perhaps, in a better position to face the 
modern "Y/age" institution. The central interest (for Marx) 
is ethical i.e. to discover why exploitation is possible un­
der the capitalist "wage" system. We may introduce ^he rel­
evant technical argument in Marx's language. 
In the surface aspect of bourgeois society, th-e 
1 K. Marx, Capital, 177- Compare Clark's "primitive" argu 
mant. 
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ker's 7'a^es appear to be the price of labour, a definite 
amount of money paid for a definite amount of labour. Peo­
ple talk about the value of the labour, and say that the 
monetary expression of that value is the necessary or natu­
ral price of the labour. People speak, also, of the market 
price of labour.,  as a price which fluctuates, on either side 
of i ts necessary price.1 
Here Marx suggests the "fallacious" wage theory which he 
seeks to correct.  
The pertinent fact is that the prospective worker is 
willing to sell his labor-power at i ts value i .e.  its value 
in use to the worker; and the prospective employer is will­
ing, likewise, to pay this value. Thus the wage-bargain is 
struck on a legally free market. But, the employee advanc­
es the value in U3e of his labor-power to the employer and 
receives "wages" i .e.  the value in use of the labor power t_o 
the employee. And, just here, we are introduced to the eth­
ical center of Marx's theory of capitalist wages. I t  is 
irrelevant for us to enter i ts technical subtleties. A par­
tial development is appropriate, however, in order to char­
acterize the ethical criterion apparently assumed as valid 
by Marx. 
The capitalist "wage" institution is grounded on values 
in exchange which, in turn, depend on "property" and "free 
competition". The capitalist wage contract,  therefore, in-
* 
evitably encourages a differential gain (surplus) in favor 
of the employer. But, has not Marx admitted that the em­
ployee gets all  he seeks i .e.  the value of his work--to him-
1 K. Marx, Capital,  583* 
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/  "arxl the capitalist scheme of awarding 
self? ^es (agrees 
values m expanse does give the employee his full self-es­
timated value of his working faculty. The critical point,  
• +v,ot the quantitative status of the value in ex-however, is that tne 
change does not preclude the employer from realising the 
full qualitative value in use of the labor power. To he 
sure, the wage bargain is completed by giving the worker his 
full value in use of the wages-estimated from the stand­
point of the necessary qualitative needs of himself 
family. Yet, more to the point,  what does the employer get? 
He gets (at least) the labor-power and working time neces­
sary to produce the quantitative equivalent of the wages giv­
en. But does he inevitably get more? Yes. Why? 
To begin with, the employee works under the 
the capitalist.  During the labor process h e  works, without 
, .  „«» 0f production owned 
freedom and independence, upon the m 
^ the worker (owned by the 
by the capitalist.  The products ol 
a  +he capitalist 
capitalist) are for sale i .e.  so fan a  
hanre. But the cap-
concerned the products are values in exc 
<vrinc more than his 
i talist (qua capitalist) is bent on rece 
(determined by past 
expenditures o n  the means of p r o d u c t i o n  t  
,  .  .  the capitalist is 
labor) and the wages he pays; that is,  
T-T the employe e  6®^3  
bent on receiving " s u r p l u s-value". 
. this "surplus val-
value received" for his efforts,  is ho 
r ) for surplus val­
ue" legitimate "profit"? No, (argues Larxj 
designed f° r  e x~ 
ue depends on the creation of values 
rhange value is.  
change, "by which less than an eouiygJb£B^J^ 
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parted with, Now, since the value of every commodity is de­
termined by the quantity of labor contained in i t ,  the cap­
italist roust realize a surplus-value because the worker has 
produced it»^ 
Since the value of labour is only an irrational expres­
sion for the value of labour power, i t  is self-evident that 
the value of the labour must invariably be less than the 
value i t  creates, for the capitalist always arranges that 
labour power shall continue in operation for a longer time 
than is necessary for the reproduction of i ts own value. In 
the foregoing example, the value of labour power operating 
for 12 hours is 3s.,  this being a value for whose reproduc­
tion labour roust operate during 6 hours. The value created, 
however, is 6s*, inasmuch as the labour power operates dur­
ing 12 hours, and the value created is dependent, not upon 
the value of the labour power i tself,  but upon the duration 
of i ts functioning. Thus we arrive at the result,  which at 
the first glance seems absurd, that labour v<"hich creates a 
value of 6s. has i tself a value of 3 s* 
Thus, value of the labor power to the worker (in order 
to keep him alive) and the use of that power in the produc­
tive process are two different things. The employer made 
the wage bargain because he recognized the peculiar value in 
use of the labor power for his exchange purposes. Labor 
power is the source of value, and of value greater than i t  
possesses i tself.  The employer follows the laws of exchange 
i .e.  he pays the exchange value of labor power and sells i ts 
value in use. Of course, i t  is fortunate for bhe employer 
that the labor power only costs a, portion of the values in 
use made in a full working day. But this "good fortune" is 
inherent in the capitalist wage system. 
^ K. Marx, Capital,  583* 
2  jbid.,  587-588. 
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The capitalist process of production thus reproduces, 
of i ts own accord, the divorce of labour power from the 
means of labour. It  reproduces and eternalises, therewith, 
the conditions for the exploitation of the worker. It  per­
petually forces the worker to sell his labour power that he 
may l ive, while perpetually enabling the capitalist to pur­
chase labour power that he may enrich himself.1 
Priefly, the process of creating surplus value is the 
continuation of the creation of exchange value beyond a def­
inite point.  The unequal advantages of the employer and em­
ployee enable the employer to force the employee towork on 
beyond the point at which his (the employee's) cost of pro­
duction is created. The excess ("unpaid" labor power) time 
is devoted to the creation of values in use which the em­
ployer will sell .  The result is surplus value owned by the 
employer, which the unpaid labor power created. 
Mow let us turn to consider the capitalist.  He wants 
to get as much labour as possible for as l i t t le money as 
possible. The only thing, therefore, which interests him in 
practice, is the difference between the price of labour pow­
er and the value which i ts function creates. But he tries 
to buy all  commodities as cheaply as possible, and invaria­
bly explains his profit  to himself as due simply to buying 
cheap and selling dear, to buying a thing below its value 
and selling it  above i ts value. He therefore falls to real­
ise that,  if  such a thing as the value of labour really ex­
isted, and he really paid this value, no capital could ex­
ist,  for his money could not be transformed into capital.2 
Viewing this brief exposition of Marx's criticism of 
the capitalistic scheme of wage payment, what are we justi­
fied in concluding as to the ethical criterion apparently 
assumed as valid? Apparently, a relevant reply should point 
1  K. Marx, Capital.  634. 
2  Tbid..  590. 
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to Marx's conception of the substantial value of labor power. 
The capitalist wage institution (for Marx) is ethically un­
sound. An ethical return to the worker is the full creation 
of his labor-power—not just the portion of it which he is 
forced to take by a contractual process. The ethical view 
here (for Marx) is not that the "employee" is over-worked--
but that the fruits of his work are systematically diverted 
to the favored owners of the "rights" to produce. How can 
workers—who create all values--enjoy the results (and stim­
ulation) of creative work when their values (above bare cost 
of production) are pyramided, by capitalistic accumulation, 
in the hands of "employers"? Back of the "wage" phenomenon, 
is the elemental relation of production for consumption. 
Here is the primitive ethical criterion for a re-ordered in­
stitution i.e. to each according to his needs, from each 
according to his powers. 
To do fair justice to Marx's ethical position would re­
quire an exposition of his entire economic system. Suffice 
it to conclude, that (for Marx) his wage analysis points be­
yond to the inevitable obliteration of the wage category--a 
slow institutional evolution, whereby virtual "wage slavery" 
will be transcended. The new order of communism is apparent­
ly an ethical-economic process and ideal—the full structure 
of Marx's ethical criterion—into which the restricted wage 
analysis of this study need not go. 
The capitalist method of appropriation proceeding out 
of the capitalist method of production, and consequently 
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capitalist private property, is the first negation of indiv­
idual private property based upon individual labour. But, 
with the inexorability of a law of nature, capitalist pro­
duction begets itB own negation, it is a negation of a 
negation. This second negation doe3 not reestablish private 
property, but it does reestablish individual property upon 
the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era.; i.e. on 
cooperation and the common ownership of the land and of the 
means of production (which labour itself produces).i 
Tltalics added). 
* K. Marx, Capital, 846. 
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V I I I  
A GENERIC CONCLUSION 
The autonomous nature of the several "brief studies 
made, and our non-critical attitude, combine to make re-it­
eration (or further comparison) of the ethical criteria 
tiresome rather than fruitful.  
We began our essay by pointing to the philosophical 
(or logical) motive of clarification of the ethical charac­
ter of wage theory. It  is appropriate to close with the 
same emphasis, for this logical effort has determined the 
course of our analyses. Our studies appear, however, to 
warrant a generic conclusion, which may be briefly defined 
by way of a relevant test.  We will  select at random for 
scrutiny a facile, and radical,  type of repudiation of ethi­
cal interest (and criterion) in wage theory. 
Founded in 1924, The Halley Stewart Trust is dedicated 
to economic research. The subject of the 1931 lectures was 
"The World's Economic Crisis and the Way of Escape". One 
crucial aspect of the worlds economic crisis is admittedly 
the wide-spread failure to pay labor to produce. Reflective 
reading of the theories of wages in these lectures (in the 
light of our studies) will lead, i t  is believed, to the gen­
eric conviction that theories of wages always include an im­
manent ethics of wages. It  is believed that this immanent 
human attention is necessary in wage theory and should be 
explicitly avowed, to the end that the ethical criterion, 
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inevitably invoked by implication, will be given the logical 
attention i t  properly deserves. 
For example, in the volume just cited, Sir William Bev-
eridge takes the characteristic point of view that wages 
should be guided by the free play of prices, ethics (on this 
viev?) being extraneous to the economic Issues. 
The crisis of today represents a failure to manage cre­
dit.  to avoid alternate infla-tion and deflation of purchas­
ing power. There is here, I  believe, an inescapable 
fatal danger—the danger of mixing control and freedom. We 
have to decide either to let production be guided by the 
free play of prices or to plan i t  soeialistically from be­
ginning to end.2 
But i t  seems sound to point out that the good of the produc 
t ive system is promoted (according to Beveridge) by elimin 
ating interferences with the free play of prices. This im 
plies a course of conduct and a relevant human criterion 
which may properly be called ethical.  It  should be emp 
sized that the results of Beveridge's theory of managed 
credit" will improve, ex hypotheai,  the successful work ng 
of the productive system e.g. employment. Without fu 
ethical evidence, therefore, i t  is fair to say that Be 
ridge's arguments for credit adjustment constitute et— 
criteria, for they indicate what should be done in 
+hp "nroductive 
put men to work. His emphasis, then, that x,n-
i t  iS guid" 
machine is driven along by the motive of profit ,  
ed by prices" is ethical.  
1 W. Beveridge, The World 's  Scono™"^ Crisis,  l66 • 




Liberty is freedom where in the common interest there 
should be freedom.1 (italics added) 
In conclusion,. Beveridge plays with the plan of guiding 
production "directly by use", but vindicates capitalism. 
For if the capitalistic plan does not work, at worst we 
get another crisis like the present, whereas if the social­
istic plan does not work we may destroy things of more impor­
tance than economic welfare.2 
Sir Josiah Stamp takes a similar position as to the 
thoroughly financial nature of relevant problems and reme­
dies . 
The element of profit—I am not speaking of the ethics 
_of__ijb, but of the actual mechanism of it--is the mainspring 
of the expansion of employment in all countries of the world 
except Russia. That is a fact which we may as well recog­
nize whether we like it or not. Everything that touches 
profit has an important effect on the whole community. It 
is not merely a question, of social justice. Anything which 
makes it more difficult to bring together these elements has 
an effect on the speed and the mechanism and the adjustment 
of the machine which provides employment".3 (Italics added) 
Then follows a discussion of monetary wage reforms. 
We consider, as in the case of Beveridge, that this 
fiscal point of view is the operative ethical criterion, 
even where, as here, the ethical interest is explicitly dis­
counted. The principles of monetary policy which fix the 
machine that gives employment (and economic welfare) are 
normative criteria of "good" economic conduct under the 
terms of the monetary theory. For the tenn3 of the monetary 
1 W. Beveridge, The T/orld's Economic Crisis, 172. 
2 Ibid.. 185. 
3 
J. Stamp, The World's Economic Crisis. 44. 
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t h e o r y  o f  t h e  t y p i c a l  w r i t e r s  w e  a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g ,  i n d i c a t e  
d e s i r a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  c o n d u c t  ( w h e r e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o u r s e s  o f  
a c t i o n  a r e  p o s s i b l e )  t h a t  i s  p r e f e r r e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  a c h i e v e  a  
p o s i t e d  f r n a l  o f  e c o n o m i c  w e l f a r e .  T h e s e  a r e  t h e o r i e s  o f  
d e s i r a b l e  p r a c t i c a l  a c t i o n  w h i c h  i n v o k e  c r i t e r i a ,  o r  s t a n d ­
a r d s  o f  p r e f e r e n c e ,  f o r  o n e  l i n e  o f  h u m a n  c o n d u c t — r a t h e r  
t h a n  a n o t h e r .  I t  a p p e a r s ,  m o r e o v e r ,  t h a t  w h e n  t h e s e  e c o n o m ­
i s t s  g i v e  u p  t h e  p o s t u l a t e  o f  t h e  u n i f o r m i t y  o f  n a t u r e  i n  
w a g e  m a t t e r s ,  t h e i r  t h e o r i e s  a r e  e v i d e n t l y  p r a c t i c a l .  F o r ,  
these theories "select", from a diversity of detail, ££!£! 
" c a u s e s "  o f  e x c h a n g e  m o t i v e s ,  m e d i a  a n d  s t r u c t u r e s — w i t h  a n  
i n t e r e s t  i n  " e c o n o m i c  w e l f a r e " ,  a n  o b v i o u s l y  p r a c t i c  
ethical goal, conforming to a conception of a good human 
s i t u a t i o n .  I t  i s ,  i n d e e d ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  w h y  t h e  e t h i c a l  
i n t e r e s t  i s  n o t  o p e n l y  a v o w e d  a n d  e x p l i c i t l y  d e f i n e d  i n  *  £  
theory as such. Such intellectual honesty, it aPP 
c o u l d  i n  n o  w a y  v i t i a t e  t h e  m e r i t  o f  s o u n d  m e c h a n i  
y s i s ,  a n d  w o u l d  c e r t a i n l y  c l a r i f y  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  u s e  
. .  . j  i t  i s  n o t  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c  p r o c e d u r e s  d e s c r i b e d .  
" W s d "  " d e s i r a b l e "  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  w e i g h  c o n c e p t s  o f  " g o o d  a n  
i i c i t l y  i n  o r d e r  
a n d  " u n d e s i r a b l e " ,  " r i g h t "  a n d  " w r o n g  e x p  
•  r t i o n  o f  t h e  " g o o d ,  
t o  i m p l y  a  w o r k i n g  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  t h e  d i r e  
<  A c t i v i t y  c o m p l e t e -
D o  t h e s e  w r i t e r s  s e e k  m e t h o d s  o f  e c o n o m  c  
i f a r e "  O b v i o u s l y  
l y  n e u t r a l  t o  a  d e s i r e d  s t a t e  o f  h u m a n  w e  
, ,  . h e n  p r o p e r l y  v o v W S .  
n o t .  i t  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  " m a c h i n e  ,  
« « + »  ( d e t e r m i n e d  
w i l l  g i v e  "  e m p l o y m e n t " - - a n d  t h a t  " e m p  o y 1 * 1  , .  
t  " c o m m u n i t y  
e ^ t i c i e n t  " m a c h i n e "  c o n d i t i o n s )  i s  a  r e  e v  
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good? "Everything that touches profit has an important ef­
fect on the -whole community" asserts Stamp. The profit mo­
tive and the competitive "machine" are validated as a work­
ing hypothesis. That the validation is in terms "of a fact 
which we might as well recognize whether we like it or not" 
reveals a method of assumption. But that which is taken as 
valid is an industrial system and ethical philosophy which 
may aptly he described as laissez faire mechanism. That 
this is a method of exchange for social purposes would, it 
seems, not he denied} that abstract "method" may he studied 
for its own sake is, perhaps, partially truej hut that the 
wage method before us is designed for human ends that are 
implicit in its characteristic fiscal analysis, is a crucial 
fact. Is it a purely verbal matter to insist that this hu­
man reference of fiscal methodology is "ethical"? Use what­
ever term you like, the essential fact is that "human" ex­
change welfare, e.g. "employment", is sought. To say that 
the criteria of industrial efficiency are proper monetary 
devices is only to absorb, for the time being, the distinc­
tively ethical meaning into the fiscal argument. The theor­
etical result is, nevertheless, implicitly a character of 
human economy, apparently assumed as valid. Put another 
way, we may say that the terms of fiscal wage relations are 
fundamentally human in their movement and results. "Con­
duct" viewed as "fiscal conduct" is still conduct. To view 
the problems of wage c ontrol In monetary terms does not 
purge the subject matter of the ethical element inherent in 
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human adjustment. I t  is highly appropriate, therefore, to 
call this inexpugnable human character of adjustment in the 
realm of wage conduct "by the term "ethical".! Our studies of 
this essay appear to validate this generic conclusion. 
1  Professor P. A. Schilpp has helpfully called my atten­
tion to an article by H. W. Stuart,  "The Phases of the Econ­
omic Interest" in Creative Intelligence. 282-253, Henry 
Holt,  1917. The author writes on page 349: "Because so-
called economic 'choice1  Is in reality 'constructive compar-
ison' i t  must be regarded as essentially ethical in import.  
Ethics and economic theory, instead of dealing with separate 
problems of conduct, deal with distinguishable but insepar­
able stages belonging to the complete analysis of most, if  




Bohm von Bawerk, Sugen. Capital and Interest, tr. by Wil­
liam Smart, MacMillan, New York, 1590. 
Bonar, James. Philosophy & Political Economy, MacMillan, 
Hew York., 1891* 
Clark, J. B.f Contributions to the Wages Question; possi­
bility of a scientific faw of wages, American Economic 
Association, Evanston, 111., I089. 
Clark, J. B., The Philosophy of Wealth, Ginn & Co., Boston, 
1894. ' "" 
Clark, J. B., The Distribution of Wealth; A theory of wag­
es, interest and profits, MacMillan, Boston, I099. 
Clark, J. M., et al, Adam Smith 1776-I926, Univ. of Chicago, 
Chicago, 1928. 
Coe, G-. H., The Motives of Men, Charles Scribner a Sons, 
New York, 1928• 
Copeland, M. A., et al, The Trend of Economics, S. H. Slich-
ter, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1924. 
Davenport, H. J., Outlines ggS°2Bl2-I5SHZ- Uacllillan, 
New York, 1398. 
Dickinson, Z. C., Economic Motives, Harvard Press, Boston, 
1922. 
Donham, W. B.» Business TnnVs at the Unforeseen, McG 
Hill, New York, 1932. 
Eastman, ?£*, (editor) Karl Marx, The Modern Libr y, 
York, I932. 
Edie, L. D., Principles of t-he New Ec_onomicg,» 
New York, 1922. 
135 
Florence, P, S.,  Economics and Human Behavior,  W, V/. Norton, 
New York, 1927, 
Gay.,  E, F. ,  Facts & Factors in Economic History, (Articles 
"by former students),  Harpers,  New York, I932. 
Gay, E. F. ,  Profit  Sharing; & Stock Ownership for Employees, 
(a collaboration) ,  Harpers,  New York, 1926. 
Hobson, J .  A., The Economics of Distribution,.  Miaclffil lan, 
New York, 1900. 
Hobson, J .  A.,  The Conditions of Industrial  Peace, Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1927. 
Hobson, J .  A,,  Economics and Ethics,  D. C, Heath & Co.,  
Boston, 19^9* 
Hobson, J .  A.,  The Economics of Unemployment«. Allen & Unwin, 
Eoston, 1931* 
Hobson, J .  A.,  From Capitalism to Socialism, Hogarth Press,  
Eoston, 1932. 
Homan, P.  T,,  Contemporary Economic Thought,  Harpers,  Bos­
ton, 1928. 
Keynes, J .  M., et  al ,  The "Worlds Economic Crisis and the 
Way of Escape, The Century Co., New York, 1"932. 
Keynes, J .  N.,  Scope and Method of Polit ical Economy, The 
lfiacMillan Co.,  New York, 1091* 
Lutz, H, L.,  et  al ,  Facing the facts;  an Economic Diagnosis,  
Putnam, New York, I932. 
Marshall ,  Alfred. The Economics of Industry, KacMillan, New 
York, 1881. 
Marshall ,  Alfred. Principles of Economics, MacMillan, New 
York, 1910. 
Marshall ,  Alfred, Industry and Trade, MacMillan, New York, 
1919. 
Marx, Karl.  Capital:  A Critique of Polit ical Economy, Inter­
national,  New York, I929. 
Mitchell ,  W. C.,  et  al ,  Income in the United States,  Har-
court, Brace & Co., New York, 1921. 
Mitchell ,  W. C. et  al ,  Recent Social Trends in the U. S. .  
Chairman, McGraw Hill, 2 volumes, New York, 1933* 
136 
Mitchell,  W. C.,  A History of the Greenbacks, Univ. of Chi­
cago Press, Chicago, 1903-
Mitchell ,  V. C.,  The Stabilization of Business,  MacMillan, 
Hew York, 1923* 
Mitchell,  C. Business Cycles, national Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc.,  Hew York, 1927* 
Parker,  D. H.,  Human Values, Harpers,  Hew York, 1931-
Pigou, A. C.,  Unemployment,  London, Williams & Horgate,1913• 
Pigou, A. C.,  Industrial  Fluctuations, MacMillan, Hew York, 
1927 
Pigou, A. C.,  The Economics of Velfar«, MacMillan, New York, 
1929. 
Rueff,  Jacques, From the Physical 
Introduction to a s tudy_of iSconomic ant^&trnoal Theory, 
John Hopkins Press,  Baltimore, Md.,  19*9* 
Rugg, Harold, The Great Technology, John Day, Hew York,1933-
T h  r~n n  v_. The Purse and the Conscience, An 
T hSs°"? tfjhcm thj C^^UQh Mgjji Eoonomics_anq 
Bthics,  Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,  London, 97* 
Vanter, W. A., (Foundation of BUslneas ,  Lectures for 
lcno!l9U.l932, 3 Volumes, Ronald, Hew Yor*. 
Vehlen, T. B., The Instinct of Workmanship and the State_of 
the Industrial  Arts,  MacMillan, London, 19 
Vehlen, T. B.,  The Place of Science in Modern Civilization, 
Huehsch, Hew York, 1919* 
vehlen, T. B., The Engineers and the Price System, Huehsch, 
Hew York, 1921. 
